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The purpose of this Article is to explore the parameters and potential impact of the good faith standard
articulated in Disney V and clarified in Stone. Part I begins with a brief review of the historical impact of the
tension between entrepreneurial freedom and managerial accountability, and Part II explains why the Disney
standard differs significantly from the traditional understanding of good faith as the absence of subjective bad
faith. Part III points out that the court’s use of the language of bad faith to articulate the new good faith may
undercut the effectiveness of the standard. It urges further clarification of the difference between the absence
of good faith and the presence of bad faith to ensure that the Disney standard will not be reduced to a mere
semantic variation on the traditional duty of loyalty applicable only in the presence of improper—i.e.,
subjectively “bad”—motivation. Finally, Part IV examines the Disney standard’s potential to serve as a vehicle
for restoring trust in corporate directors and argues that the “new” good faith has the capacity to serve this
important function, but only if the courts utilize the doctrine to require corporate directors to engage actively
in oversight of the business and affairs of the entities entrusted to them. In the words of Chancellor Chandler,
where corporate directors consciously disregard their duties, “the law must be strong enough to intervene
against abuse of trust.”
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INTRODUCTION 
In its eagerly awaited June 2006 decision in In re Walt Disney 
Company Derivative Litigation (Disney V),1 the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the court at the “center of the corporate universe,”2 held that 
the good faith required of corporate directors encompasses “not 
simply the duties of care and loyalty, . . . but all actions required by a 
true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders.”3  The Disney standard4—what we call the “new” good 
faith—differs from traditional notions of the concept—the “old” 
good faith—in that it serves as the “doctrinal vehicle” for addressing 
conduct that “does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but 
is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.”5   
As courts and commentators have recognized, the fiduciary 
obligation to act in good faith has long been a part of Delaware’s 
corporate law,6 although it seldom has been a significant focal point 
in actions seeking to hold corporate directors accountable. The 
“new” good faith has emerged in the decade since the Chancery 
Court’s 1996 decision in In re Caremark International Derivative 
                                                          
 1. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  For a summary of the principal decisions in the 
Disney litigation see infra note 14. 
 2. See E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 
Del. L. Rev. 163, 166-67 (2005) [hereinafter Corporate Universe] (recounting 
Delaware’s progression toward this central position).  For discussion of the 
importance of the role of Delaware courts in the development of corporate 
jurisprudence, see generally William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus. 
Law. 351 (1992).  
 3. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.  
      4.   As used in this Article, the “Disney standard” refers to the duty of good faith 
articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in its June 2006 decision.  See id.   
 5. Id.  In its November 2006 decision in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme 
Court made clear that the “fundamental . . . fiduciary duty violated by [a failure to 
act in good faith] is the duty of loyalty.” No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 
2006).   Pursuant to the Delaware Supreme Court’s customary practice, the court has 
not yet released the opinion cited in this Article  “for publication in the permanent 
law reports[, and] until releases, it is subject to revision or withdrawal.”   Id. at *1.   
Stone was argued on October 5, 2006, and the court handed down its decision on 
November 6, 2006, id., after the original finalization of this Article, just as it was 
going to press.  With the able assistance of the editors of the American University 
Law Review, the authors have endeavored to incorporate this very recent decision 
into the Article, although time pressures prohibited extensive exploration all of its 
ramifications. 
      6.   See, e.g., id. at 67 & cases cited id. at n. 11; Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of 
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Good Faith in 
Corporate Law]; Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment:  A Theory of 
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L.J. 1 (2005); E. Norman Veasey 
& Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and 
Governance from 1992-2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1399 (2005) [hereinafter What Happened in Delaware]. 
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Litigation.7  As articulated in Disney V, the obligation imposes an 
affirmative duty to act when failure to do so constitutes conscious 
disregard of known directorial obligations.8  In other words, it 
requires directors to make a good faith effort to do their jobs. 
It is no accident that the new good faith has emerged and garnered 
significant attention at a time when the economic security of so many 
Americans depends on the financial health of major corporations.9  
The Delaware courts’ recent articulations of the duty of good faith 
respond to a deep need to find ways to restore trust in corporate 
directors.  This is particularly true with respect to the directors of 
major corporations who wield tremendous power over the lives of 
investors, employees, and entire communities.10 
Delaware, like all states, charges directors with the task of 
managing “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under” its laws.11  Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law permits corporations to exculpate directors from 
personal liability for breach of the duty of care in performing that 
task, but not for violations of the duty of loyalty or acts not in good 
faith.12  In its June 2006 decision in Disney V, the Delaware Supreme 
                                                          
      7.  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 8. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 62-67.  This critical distinction is discussed in Parts II 
and III infra. 
 9. In 1998, approximately fifty-two percent of Americans owned stock in one 
form or another—through individual investment, mutual funds, pension plans, 
etc.—in comparison with one percent in 1900 and thirteen percent in 1980.  See 
THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL. 252-53 (2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/ 
14business6.htm; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006 455 (125th ed. 2005), available at http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/ income.pdf (follow “Table Number 655” 
link) (detailing the composition of individuals’ savings). 
 10. Cf. Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter:  Will Increased 
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 
361, 364 (2005) (“Enron and its progeny . . . cause[d] an unimaginable ripple effect 
on the market, as tens of billions of dollars of market capital was destroyed, workers’ 
retirement plans were devastated, shareholders’ dreams were ruined, and individual 
investors’ trust in the stock market was shattered.” (citing ENRON:  CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS xi (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 
2004))).  See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY:  AMERICA’S BUSINESS 
CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 9-21 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (discussing impact of 
Enron and other recent corporate debacles on public confidence); CG Hintmann, 
Comment, You Gotta Have Faith:  Good Faith in the Context of Directorial Fiduciary Duties 
and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 571, 571 n.3 (2005) 
(citing CITIZEN WORKS, THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET (2003), http://www.citizen 
works.org/corp/corp-scandal.php) (noting large number of companies investigated 
for dishonesty and fraud in the 200-2005 period). 
 11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).  For the relevant statutory text, see 
infra text accompanying note 153. 
 12. Id. § 102(b)(7).  This controversial provision was added in 1986 in the wake 
of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).  See supra text accompanying 
notes 134-149. 
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Court confirmed that even exculpatory provisions do not permit 
unbridled directorial disregard of management responsibilities.13  
The court agreed with Chancellor Chandler, who tried the case, that 
good faith serves to “ensure that the persons entrusted by 
shareholders to govern Delaware corporations do so with an honesty 
of purpose and with an understanding of whose interests they are 
there to protect.”14   
Despite these lofty words, Disney V upheld the Chancery Court’s 
ruling in favor of the defendant directors, and the tone of the court’s 
subsequent decision in Stone v. Ritter15 suggests that it is anxious to 
avoid a flood of litigation alleging general breaches of the duty to act 
in good faith.16  Nevertheless, both decisions make clear that good 
faith is a distinct fiduciary obligation,17 although Stone defines this 
obligation as a component of the “fundamental” fiduciary duty of 
loyalty, rather than as a freestanding duty, at least in Caremark-type 
                                                          
     13. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 65. 
     14. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 760 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005).  See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 
66-67.  The shareholder derivative litigation involving The Walt Disney Company has 
produced six opinions, four of which are discussed in this Article.  This series of 
decisions began with In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 
380 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ initial complaint for failing to plead 
facts sufficient to support their claim and excuse pre-suit demand), followed by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000) (upholding the Chancellor’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss, but giving the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint). The 
third decision was In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 825 A.2d 275, 
291 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint and allowing claim for breach “of the foundational directorial 
obligation to act honestly and in good faith” to proceed); the fourth was In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), No. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (granting defendant Michael Ovitz’s motion for partial summary 
judgment); the fifth was In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 
at 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) (post-trial opinion, finding no waste or breach of fiduciary 
duties by the defendant directors).  Disney V, 906 A.2d at 27 (upholding Chancellor’s 
decision in favor of the defendant directors) is the last of these decisions.  This 
Article discusses Brehm, Disney II, Disney IV, and Disney V. 
     15.    No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006). 
     16. Stone involved a shareholders’ derivative action seeking to hold directors 
liable for failing to put in place monitoring systems adequate to enable them to learn 
of illegal employee conduct that ultimately required  the corporation to pay criminal 
and civil fines and penalties of $50 million.  Id. at *1.  See infra text accompanying 
notes Part II.B.3.d. 
     17. Stone, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6.  In dicta, the court sought to clarify related 
doctrinal issues.  It termed the language of Disney V and earlier cases referring to 
good faith “as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and 
loyalty,” as a way of describing good faith “colloquially.”  Id. at *6.  The Stone opinion 
also characterized the duty of good faith as an “indirect” basis for imposing 
directorial liability, noting that the Disney V court reserved the “issue, whether a 
violation of the duty to act in good faith is a basis for the direct imposition of liability, 
was expressly left open in Disney [V].”   Id. at n.29.  See infra text accompanying note 
30 and Part II.B.3.d. 
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oversight or monitoring failures.18  The operative question is what the 
recognition of this obligation means for corporate directors and their 
constituents. 
Disney V is the culmination of extensive judicial exploration of the 
limits of section 102(b)(7).19  As a practical matter, the statute created 
an environment in which directors had little risk of liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty unless they engaged in the kind of 
impermissible self-dealing traditionally prohibited by the duty of 
loyalty.20  Virtually every major corporation accepted section 
                                                          
     18.  See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(approving settlement agreement between parties).  The Caremark decision is 
discussed infra Part II.A.2.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s location of the good faith 
obligation within the duty of loyalty was far from a foregone conclusion.  Some 
Chancery Court decisions, see, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505-07 (Del. 
Ch. 2003), discussed good faith in terms of the duty of loyalty.  Other opinions, 
however, including some Delaware Supreme Court decisions, referred to good faith 
as an element of the “triad[] of . . . fiduciary duties—good faith, loyalty or due care” 
applicable to the conduct of corporate directors.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), or as one of directors’ “three primary duties.”  
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001). Although Chancellor 
Chandler characterized an absence of good faith as “disloyal” conduct in Disney IV, 
he described the underlying allegations as either “sounding in the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty,” or as examples of “severe violations of the fiduciary duty of care.”  Disney IV, 
907 A.2d 755 n.463.  Significant scholarly commentary anticipated that good faith 
would emerge as an independent duty.    See, e.g.,  Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 5-6; 
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 482-83 (2004); see also 
sources cited infra note 28. Perhaps most significantly, section 102(b)(7)(i) contains 
a specific exclusion for disloyal acts and omissions separate and apart from acts or 
omissions “not in good faith.”  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006), set forth 
in pertinent part infra text accompanying note 156.  If violations of the duty to act in 
good faith comprise a  species of disloyalty, it is hard to understand why the Delaware 
legislature provided separate exclusions for each in section 102(b)(7).  Cf., Guttman, 
823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (suggesting  legislature amendment of  section 102(b)(7) to 
clarify that all of the exclusions set forth in its subsections pertain to disloyal 
conduct). 
 19. See, e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 505-07 (discussing possible bases for Caremark-
type claims); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (noting purpose 
of section 102(b)(7) to protect directors from personal liability for damages arising 
from violation of duty of care but not against damage liability arising from violation 
of duty of loyalty or bad faith claims); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061 (Del. 
1996) (finding that section 102(b)(7) amendment to corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation protected directors from liability for monetary damages for good faith 
omissions); O’Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 914 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (noting established rule that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability 
for good faith actions even if they violate the duty of care). 
 20. While WorldCom’s twelve outside directors paid more than twenty-four 
million dollars to resolve claims against them as a result of the accounting fraud that 
led to the company’s bankruptcy, and Enron’s outside directors paid thirteen 
million, a recent article based on empirical data suggests that “out-of-pocket liability 
for outside directors over the last several decades has been rare” and that even now 
“their risk remains very low.”  Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, 
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1138-39 (2006); see also Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267-68 (1999) 
[hereinafter Social Norms] (noting the reduced threat of directorial liability even in 
the presence of exceptions to exculpatory statutes); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, 
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102(b)(7)’s invitation to protect its directors from personal liability 
for breach of the duty of care.21  Consequently, for the directors of 
most large public corporations, the enactment of section 102(b)(7) 
and its counterparts in other states transformed the duty of care into 
an aspirational objective rather than a standard of liability.22 
The tide began to turn against directors following the corporate 
scandals that nearly brought down Caremark23 and Columbia/HCA 
in the 1990s.24  In the course of the litigation that followed, 
shareholders contended that the good faith exception to section 
102(b)(7) provided a basis for holding directors liable for sleeping at 
the switch.25  These cases sparked an important doctrinal 
development, one that the corporate world has watched with 
particular interest in the wake of Enron’s collapse and the other 
major financial debacles that have occurred since 2001.26  Since the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s 1996 decision in Caremark,27 both courts 
and commentators have debated whether good faith ultimately would 
                                                          
Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. 
L. REV. 393, 394-95 (2005) [hereinafter Spare the Rod] (observing apparent social 
agreement against major directorial liability, even in light of recent corporate 
scandals). See generally E. Norman Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in 
Light of Current Events, 19 No. 2 INSIGHTS 9, 15-16 (2005) [hereinafter Perspective] 
(agreeing with statement attributed to Vice Chancellor Strine that “Independent 
directors who apply themselves to their duties in good faith have a trivial risk of legal 
liability”).  
 21. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 752. 
 22. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 (distinguishing statutory corporate duties from 
“aspirational goals of ideal corporate practice”). Even the kind of inattention to 
directorial duties previously excepted from the protection of the business judgment 
rule in cases such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981) 
(abdication of directorial duties violates duty of care), arguably fell within the 
purview of the exculpatory provisions authorized by the statute prior to the courts’ 
recognition of the significance of the good faith exception to section 102(b)(7).  See 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
    23.  See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(approving settlement agreement between parties).  These cases are discussed infra 
Part II.A.2. 
 24. See McCall v. Scott (McCall I), 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), amended on denial 
of reh’g by McCall II, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 25. See McCall II, 250 F.3d at 1001; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.   See generally David 
H. Cook, The Emergence of Delaware’s Good Faith Fiduciary Duty:  In re Emerging 
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 91, 94 (2004) (noting that 
Caremark “was perhaps the first significant case to breathe life into the duty of good 
faith”). 
 26. See Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board:  The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1235 (2003) (“Enron “serve[d] as a ‘perfect storm’ metaphor that the 
checks and balances in the American system of corporate governance [were] not 
working . . . .”).  For a litany of the events that took place in 2002 in the wake of the 
Enron debacle, see Year of Scandals, Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6 (listing 2002 
events related to corporate managerial misfeasance). 
 27. 698 A.2d at 971. 
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emerge as an independent fiduciary obligation.28  In Disney V, the 
Delaware Supreme Court responded that, like loyalty and care, good 
faith is an element of “the triad of fiduciary duties” applicable to 
corporate directors.29  While the court’s recent opinion in Stone v. 
Ritter describes this particular reference as “colloquial” and backs 
away from characterizing the good faith obligation as a “direct” basis 
for liability,30 the Stone court stresses that a “director cannot act loyally 
toward a corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her 
actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”31  Thus, a director’s 
“conscious disregard for [directorial] responsibilities. . . is properly 
treated as a nonexculpable, nonindemnifiable violation of the 
fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”32 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the parameters and 
potential impact of the good faith standard articulated in Disney V 
and clarified in Stone.  Part I begins with a brief review of the 
historical impact of the tension between entrepreneurial freedom 
and managerial accountability, and Part II explains why the Disney 
standard differs significantly from the traditional understanding of 
good faith as the absence of subjective bad faith.  Part III points out 
that the court’s use of the language of bad faith to articulate the new 
good faith may undercut the effectiveness of the standard.  It urges 
further clarification of the difference between the absence of good 
faith and the presence of bad faith to ensure that the Disney standard 
will not be reduced to a mere semantic variation on the traditional 
duty of loyalty applicable only in the presence of improper—i.e., 
subjectively “bad”—motivation.  Finally, Part IV examines the Disney 
standard’s potential to serve as a vehicle for restoring trust in 
corporate directors and argues that the “new” good faith has the 
capacity to serve this important function, but only if the courts utilize 
the doctrine to require corporate directors to engage actively in 
oversight of the business and affairs of the entities entrusted to them.  
In the words of Chancellor Chandler, where corporate directors 
                                                          
 28. Hillary Sale wrote the first in-depth analysis of the recent emergence of the 
duty of good faith in 2004.  See Sale, supra note 18, at 456.  Former Delaware Chief 
Justice Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo discussed the emerging duty of good faith 
in a 2005 article recounting developments in Delaware’s corporate law during his 
tenure on the court.  See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6.  In addition, Melvin 
Eisenberg published a comprehensive analysis in 2006 shortly before the Delaware 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Disney V.  See Good Faith in Corporate Law, 
supra note 6.  A number of other commentators also published helpful articles prior 
to Disney V.  See sources cited infra note 229. 
     29. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). 
     30. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006). 
     31.    Id. (quoting Gutman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
     32. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67. 
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consciously disregard their duties, “the law must be strong enough to 
intervene against abuse of trust.”33 
I. FROM ROBBER BARONS TO THE WIDOW PRITCHARD:  THE 
STRUGGLE TO BALANCE MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY WITH 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FREEDOM 
Every jurisdiction requires directors to be loyal to the corporations 
they manage and to exercise care in the conduct of corporate 
business.  These fiduciary mandates—known as the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of care—are set forth in judicial decisions and state 
corporations codes.34  They do not, however, describe precise 
standards.  On the contrary, the operation of these fiduciary duties 
often depends on context interpreted through the lens of the core 
principle that directors must act in good faith in a manner that they 
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of their corporations.35  
Until recently, however, courts seldom invoked good faith as a basis 
for holding directors personally liable; they certainly did not identify 
good faith as a fiduciary duty in its own right.36 A brief review of the 
relevant historical background helps to explain how and why the 
need for a new articulation of the good faith standard arose. 
A. The Corporate Form and Its Abuses 
A corporation’s board of directors has ultimate responsibility for 
the management of its business.37  While directors rely on officers to 
manage the company’s day-to-day affairs, the board itself is the 
highest decision-making authority, except as to those few key matters 
left to shareholders.38  The law, however, has struggled with the 
question of how to hold directors, particularly outside directors, 
accountable for fulfilling their critical role.39  The roots of this 
struggle date back to the emergence of the modern corporation and 
the quest to regulate both the external power and the internal 
                                                          
    33.  Disney II, 825 A.2d at 275. 
 34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 141 (2006); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 
(McKinney 2006); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2006). 
 35. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66; see also, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2005). 
 36. See Cook, supra note 25, at 92-93 (describing emerging Delaware good faith 
obligation as an independent fiduciary duty). 
 37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006) (detailing the composition and 
managerial powers and functions of board of directors); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01 (2005). 
 38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 275 (requiring shareholder vote in 
context of mergers and dissolutions respectively). 
 39. See Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 408-09, 453-55. 
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management of corporate entities without unduly compromising 
either efficiency or innovation.40 
In the earliest period of American legal history, business 
corporations were publicly chartered, principally for public utility 
purposes; in the period from 1780 to 1801, nearly two-thirds of 
special state corporations charters were for inland navigation, 
turnpikes and toll roads, while fewer than four percent were for 
general business corporations.41  As Lawrence Friedman notes, in the 
entire eighteenth century only 335 businesses were granted corporate 
charters.42  Their purposes were circumscribed, and, unlike modern 
corporations, their periods of duration were fixed, rather than 
perpetual.43  As the eighteenth century drew to a close, however, the 
new nation needed credit and a transportation infrastructure to 
facilitate growth and development.44  The corporate form was well 
suited to meet these needs, and by the 1820s merchants and 
manufacturers, too, began to adopt the corporate form.45  It was not 
until later in the nineteenth century, however, that technological 
advances—most notably the railroads—gave corporations “a 
commanding position in the economy [that t]hey never lost.”46  The 
corporate form enabled business people “to expand their operations 
beyond what a few individuals could fund, manage, and carry out,”47 
permitting them “to elicit ongoing investment of human capital by 
specialized managers, along with committed financial capital from 
financial advisors.”48  The corporate structure provided a legal 
framework ideally suited to amassing the vast sums necessary to 
                                                          
 40. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 390-400 (3d ed. 
2005) (outlining development of corporate law). 
 41. J. W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 17 (1970). 
 42. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 129 (noting that most colonial corporate 
charters were for “churches, charities, or cities or boroughs”); see also Margaret M. 
Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1, 
4-6 (2004) (discussing the emergence of the corporate form). 
 43. Id. at 131. 
 44. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1492-93 (1998) (documenting historical backdrop of the 
emergence of corporations in the United States). 
 45. Id. 
 46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 390. 
 47. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:  What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 387, 427 (2003). 
     48. Id.; See also Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 
1832, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 56-57 (2002) (tracing emergence of fundamental 
attributes of American corporations in conjunction with industrial development); 
Blair, supra note 42, at 27 (corporate form “facilitates the locking-in of invested 
capital”). 
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develop capital-intensive industries and to facilitate accomplishment 
of business and financial objectives.49 
In 1795, North Carolina enacted a statute permitting incorporation 
without a public charter.50  By 1850 a number of states allowed 
incorporation for a limited business purpose, and by 1875 permission 
to incorporate for “any lawful purpose” had become common.51  As 
legal historian Lawrence Friedman explains, “[n]o longer was the 
business corporation a unique, ad hoc creation. . . .  Rather, it was 
becoming the general form in which to cast the organization of one’s 
business—legally open to all, and with few real restrictions on entry, 
duration, and management.”52 
In 1933, Justice Brandeis wrote that states long restricted freedom 
to incorporate because “[t]here was a sense of some insidious 
menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when 
held by corporations.”53  During the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, these early concerns seemed warranted; abuses proliferated 
and engendered considerable disenchantment—particularly with 
large corporations and the infamous robber barons who ran them.54  
There were many causes for concern, but two were primary.  First, 
across the nation many Americans protested that corporations had 
gained far too much power over the economy as a whole.55  The 
monopolistic practices of the “trusts” became a national scandal as 
corporate leviathans began to undermine the competitiveness and 
efficiency of the very markets that gave birth to them.56  Congress 
responded by passing the Sherman Act in 1890,57 and in 1906 and 
1907 President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration initiated the 
                                                          
 49. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 394-95. 
 50. 1 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 
2, at 8 (Perm. Ed. 1999). 
 51. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 n.2, 555 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting).  Until the latter date, “the duration of corporate franchises was 
generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50 years.”  Id. at 555.  As late as 1903, 
almost half the states limited the duration to 20 or 50 years.  Id. at 555 n.29. 
     52.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 390-91. 
 53. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 54. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391-93 (illustrating legislative and judicial 
reactions to such abuses).  The classic early account is MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE 
ROBBER BARONS:  THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS (1934). 
 55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 392. 
 56. See id. at 399-400.  See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business 
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1452 (“The public’s anti-
corporate sentiment stemmed from the very thing that made corporations successful:  
their ability to concentrate capital.”). 
 57. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006). 
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antitrust actions that led to the break-up of the huge Standard Oil 
and American Tobacco trusts in 1911.58 
Second, financial fraud was commonplace.59  In the words of 
Lawrence Friedman, “[t]he investment market was totally 
unregulated; no SEC kept it honest, and the level of morality among 
promoters was painfully low, to put it mildly.  It was a generation of 
vultures. . . . The investing public was unmercifully fleeced.”60  Often 
state legislatures seemed “supine [and] powerless.”61  Eventually, in 
the wake of the disastrous stock market crash of 1929, Congress 
enacted the Securities Act of 193362 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 193463 to address abuses in the issuance and trading of securities 
issues.   
As is evident from these developments, in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, there was 
considerable public distrust of large corporations and those who 
managed them.64  The focus of these concerns, however, was 
primarily on the consequences of business power—the danger of 
monopolies and the unabashed exploitation of the public.65  While 
the ability to accumulate capital under the corporate form facilitated 
these abuses, the corporate form itself was not the object of 
reformers’ attentions.66  The legal responses entailed external 
limitations on corporate power—such as the prohibition of 
                                                          
 58. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81-82 (1911) 
(upholding decision finding defendants’ actions combining their oil company stock 
to constitute an attempt to monopolize the oil industry and a restraint of trade); 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184-85 (1911) (finding defendants 
in violation of antitrust laws and ordering lower court to develop a plan for 
dissolution of combination). 
 59. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 392. 
 62. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006). 
 63. Id. §§ 78a-78mm. 
 64. What mattered to the public, however, was not necessarily the concern of 
businessmen.  As Professor Hurst put it, “from the late 1880’s into the 1930’s, [w]e 
treated the corporate instrument as so useful for desired economic growth as to 
warrant using law to make it available on terms most responsive to businessmen’s 
needs or wishes.”  HURST, supra note 41, at 62.  Hurst further stated that “utility 
rather than the responsibility aspect of legitimacy dominated development of public 
policy toward the business corporation . . . .”  Id.  Although the law of corporations 
was responsive to the needs of business during the period, the statement is 
questionable from a broader perspective.  While the administrations of Warren 
Harding and Calvin Coolidge were universally regarded as “pro-business,” the 
Progressive Era administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson 
sponsored a number of reforms to which corporate leaders were inveterately hostile. 
 65. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391. 
 66. See id. at 399 (noting policy focus on regulation rather than restructuring 
corporations). 
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monopoly and other abuses in the antitrust laws67 and the issuance 
and trading requirements established by the Securities Act of 193368 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.69  But these measures 
usually did not directly impact corporate governance structures. 
Today, we are once again in the throes of a crisis in corporate trust, 
but the nature of the principal concerns is dramatically different.70  
Since the last decades of the twentieth century, the genesis of the 
dominant problem has been internal rather than external corporate 
power—a failure of corporate governance structures and standards to 
prevent flagrant abuses by insiders at many different levels.71  Today, 
governance, particularly the relationship between directors and 
shareholder-investors, is necessarily a central concern of corporate 
law.72 
B. The Role of Directors in Corporate Governance 
The original model for defining the director-shareholder 
relationship emerged from the law of trusts.73  This is not surprising, 
for the duty of a trustee is a paradigm for allocation of fiduciary 
responsibilities in cases where one person holds money or property 
on behalf of another.74  In addition, the rules governing financial 
trusts were already well established by the time courts began to define 
the core relationships of corporate governance.75  Consequently, the 
potential fit appealed to courts and commentators.76  There was 
significant support for the idea that a corporate manager should be 
“a trustee—a guardian,” with “every shareholder . . . [as] his ward” 
and, at least in cases of large public enterprises, “the community [as] 
his cestui qui trust.”77  A number of nineteenth-century judicial 
decisions reflect a similar propensity to invoke the law of trusts in the 
corporate arena.78 
                                                          
     67. See id. at 346-49. 
 68. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006). 
 69. Id. §§ 78a-78mm. 
 70. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1235-36 (pointing to Enron as an 
illustration of control failure in corporate structure). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See, e.g., DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 363 (discussing “tidal wave” of 
corporate governance crises and regulatory reforms engendered by recent scandals). 
 73. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 393. 
     74. Id. at 393-94. 
     75. Id. at 393-95. 
     76. Id. 
     77. See id. at 394 (quoting Charles Francis Adams, Jr.). 
     78. See id. (citing Ark. Valley Agric. Soc’y v. Eichholtz, 25 P. 613 (Kan. 1891); 
Marshall v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586 (Va. 1889)). 
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The conservative rules of the trust approach, however, did not fit 
the entrepreneurial mold of corporate capitalism and its captains.79  
As the twentieth century dawned and the corporate form became 
increasingly popular, corporations began to grow and diversify.80  It 
was evident that the skills that made individuals successful business 
directors were not necessarily the same qualities that made good 
trustees.81  It soon became clear that saddling corporate directors with 
the kinds of standards applicable to the guardians of trusts and 
eleemosynary institutions was counterproductive.82  This approach 
suited neither the needs of evolving business corporations nor the 
objectives of their investors.83  Consequently, the courts began to 
develop a separate set of principles for corporate management.84 
As the law of corporate governance evolved, what remained of the 
trustee model was the idea that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, and, indirectly, to its shareholders.85  The principal 
components of this fiduciary obligation emerged as the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of care.86  Courts and legislatures defined and refined the 
parameters of these duties over time.87  The duty of loyalty came to be 
epitomized in the oft-cited language of Judge Cardozo in his famous 
1928 opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon88—“the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive.”89  While an absolute prohibition of transactions 
between a corporation and its officers or directors proved 
undesirable for a variety of reasons,90 the principle of transparency 
provided for disclosure of conflicting interests and recusal of 
interested directors from the decision-making process.91  Thus, the 
law required directors to put the well-being of the corporation before 
their personal interests, although in its classic application the duty of 
loyalty became principally associated with “a financial or other 
                                                          
     79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 395-96. 
 81. Id. at 393-94. 
 82. Id. at 394. 
 83. Id. at 394-95. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 394 (discussing early judicial attempts to rein in corporate 
directors and officers (citing Ark. Valley Agric. Soc’y v. Eichholtz, 25 P. 613 (Kan. 1891); 
Marshall v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586 (Va. 1889))). 
 85. See id. at 393. 
 86. See, e.g., Hintmann, supra note 10, at 577-79 (identifying fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care). 
     87. See, e.g., id. 
 88. 164 N.E. 545, 548-49 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a 
share of the proceeds from the defendant’s purchase of a leasehold estate because 
the opportunity arose in connection with the parties’ joint “coadventure”). 
 89. Id. at 546. 
 90. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8F cmt. (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 170(1) (2003). 
     91. See Hintmann, supra note 10, at 578. 
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cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.”92  With respect to the duty of 
care, the courts struggled to strike the proper balance between 
entrepreneurial freedom and managerial accountability.93  The 
solution that emerged, the fundamental rule of judicial review of 
corporate decisions, became known as the business judgment rule.94 
1. The business judgment rule and the gutting of the duty of care 
The business judgment rule is “the foundation of our corporation 
law.”95  Its practical function, however, is to limit significantly the 
demands imposed by the duty of care, because it “teaches that courts 
will not second-guess directors’ business decisions and will not 
interfere with the expectation of investors that directors will take 
honest and prudent business risks to advance the economic well-
being of the enterprise.”96  The conceptual underpinning of early 
iterations of the business judgment rule was virtually identical to the 
policy considerations invoked today:  business is most likely to 
succeed and flourish when business managers are free to make 
decisions unfettered by outside interference or judicial second-
guessing.97 
The famous case of Shlensky v. Wrigley98 illustrates the deference 
courts accord management decisions pursuant to the business 
judgment rule.  As baseball aficionados and students of corporate law 
                                                          
 92. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006); see 
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 578 (noting that “[a]t common law a transaction 
involving conflicts of interest was void or voidable[, and that m]odern courts have 
been more lenient, but they still require the self-dealing director to act with the 
utmost good faith and scrupulous fairness” (citing DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:  FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 130-38 (4th ed. 
1993 & Supp. 1995)). 
 93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 129 (2004). 
 94. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 396. 
 95. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1442. 
 96. Id.  See also Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 129 (“Choosing the appropriate 
balance between authority and accountability is the central problem of business 
judgment jurisprudence.”).  For an analysis of the ongoing tension between authority 
and accountability in corporate governance, see id. at 107-09.  The policy 
justifications for the business judgment rule—encouraging qualified persons to serve 
as directors and to take appropriate risks, judicial restraint, and preservation of the 
board’s role in governing corporations—arguably differ when the actions at issue are 
those of officers rather than directors.  For a discussion of reasons why the rule 
should not apply to the actions of officers, see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers 
and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 455-69 (2005). 
 97. See generally ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS § 12.2.2 at 204 (5th ed. 2006); 
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 575 (noting that “[r]eluctance toward second-guessing 
business decisions dates back more than 250 years in English law to The Charitable 
Corp. v. Sutton [(1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch.)] and the 1829 Louisiana Supreme 
Court decision in Percy v. Millaudon [8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829)]”). 
 98. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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are well aware, in the late 1960’s the Chicago Cubs remained the only 
major league team that did not play home games at night.99  Shlensky, 
a minority shareholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club, 
Inc. (“the Cubs”), challenged the refusal of the Cubs’ board to outfit 
the stadium for night games.  Shlensky attributed operating losses to 
inadequate attendance at home.100  At the time, all nineteen other 
major league baseball teams played under the lights.101 
The Cubs’ directors denied Shlensky’s contention that their 
decision was based on the idiosyncratic preferences of president and 
majority shareholder Philip K. Wrigley, rather than good business.  
The directors claimed that the potentially deleterious impact of night 
games on the neighborhood surrounding the Cubs’ stadium justified 
their approach.102  The Illinois Appellate Court upheld a trial court 
decision in the directors’ favor.  The court stressed that shareholders 
elect directors to exercise business judgment.  It emphasized that 
“the decision [was] one properly before directors and the motives 
alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or 
conflict of interests in their making of that decision,” and that “unless 
the conduct of the defendants at least borders on one of [those] 
elements, the courts should not interfere.”103  The court concluded by 
admonishing against judicial interference with board decisions in the 
absence of “a clear showing of dereliction of duty.”104 
Shlensky and other decisions emphasizing the importance of 
entrepreneurial freedom make it clear that the business judgment 
rule is a process-oriented standard.105  As Delaware’s former Chief 
Justice Veasey recently explained, “the focus of the business judgment 
rule remains on the process that directors use in reaching their 
decisions.”106 Clearly, the latitude afforded to directors under the 
business judgment rule differs from the constraints the law of trusts 
imposes on trustees.  Moreover, the business judgment rule provides 
corporate directors with a degree of protection unavailable to most of 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 777.  The Cubs eventually played the first night game at Wrigley Field 
on August 8, 1988.   See  Chicago Cubs website, http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/NAS 
App/mlb/chc/ballpark/index.jsp. 
 100. 237 N.E.2d. at 777-78. 
 101. Id. at 777. 
 102. Id. at 778. 
 103. Id. at 780. 
 104. Id. at 779. 
 105. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 
1996)(“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by deep 
respect for all good faith board decisions.”). 
   106. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1421.   
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those who receive compensation for their services in other fields.107  
The rationale for applying the business judgment rule, however, 
breaks down when directors fail to fulfill their basic obligation to pay 
attention to the affairs of the entities they manage. 
2. The problem of dereliction of directorial duty 
As corporate law developed, another species of disputes about 
fiduciary responsibilities emerged involving allegations of disregard 
or dereliction of directorial duties.  In Barnes v. Andrews,108 for 
example, Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a director could be liable 
for “general inattention to his duties as a director.”109  Judge Hand 
reached this conclusion even though the integrity of the defendant 
director was “unquestioned.”110  Although “[n]o men of sense would 
take the office [of director], if the law imposed upon them a guaranty 
of the general success of their companies as a penalty for any 
negligence,”111 the defendant director “had allowed himself to be 
carried along as a figurehead”112 without adequately informing 
himself of the corporation’s business affairs.113  The director escaped 
liability, even though the court could not “acquit [him] of misprision 
in his office,”114 because it concluded that there was no evidence that 
the director’s inattention had caused the mortal harm suffered by the 
company.115 
More than fifty years later, the issue of directorial inattention arose 
in another well known case, Francis v. United Jersey Bank.116  In an 
                                                          
  107.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in Joy v. 
North: 
Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed 
or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in 
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to 
economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will 
rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation. 
Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon 
corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance 
to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally 
labeled the business judgment rule. 
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).  See also infra text accompanying notes  
341-345. 
 108. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 109. Id. at 615. 
 110. Id. at 616. 
 111. Id. at 617. 
 112. Id. at 616. 
 113. Id. at 615-16. 
 114. Id. at 616. 
 115. Id. at 617-18. 
 116. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).  Although the company was incorporated in New 
York, the court applied New Jersey law because “New Jersey had more significant 
relationships to the parties and the transactions than New York.”  Id. at 820.  This 
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unusual state of affairs, the proverbial poor widow was the defendant 
rather than the plaintiff.  Following her husband’s death, Mrs. Lillian 
Pritchard and her two sons served as directors of the family 
reinsurance brokerage business; the two sons were also officers of the 
company.117  Although her late husband had warned Mrs. Pritchard 
that their son Charles, Jr. “would take the shirt off my back,”118 she 
neglected her directorial duties, preferring instead to focus her 
attention on her gin.  While their mother was asleep at the switch, the 
boys misappropriated large sums of money and soon drove the 
company into bankruptcy.119 
The trustees in bankruptcy sued Mrs. Pritchard for breach of 
fiduciary duty and continued the action against her estate following 
her death.120  Remarking that “[t]he sentinel asleep at his post 
contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect,”121 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held Mrs. Pritchard’s estate liable for her 
breach of the duty of care because of a complete failure to perform 
her duties as a director.122  In so doing, the court upheld the trial 
court’s rejection of the argument that Mrs. Pritchard should be 
excused because she was simply a poor widow, overwhelmed by grief 
and exploited by wicked children.123  The high court held that, as a 
director, Mrs. Pritchard was obligated to “discharge [her] duties in 
good faith and act as ordinarily prudent person would under similar 
circumstances in like positions.”124  Unlike Judge Hand in Barnes v. 
Andrews,125 the Francis court found that the plaintiffs had established 
causation for their losses.126  In so doing the court warned:  “A 
director is not an ornament, but an essential component of corporate 
governance.  Consequently, a director cannot protect himself behind 
a paper shield bearing the motto, ‘dummy director.’”127 
Barnes and Francis illustrate a judicial reluctance to interpret the 
business judgment rule to bar actions against directors who fail to 
                                                          
choice of law was contrary to the internal affairs doctrine, under which the law of the 
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of a corporation. 
 117. Id. at 818. 
 118. Id. at 819. 
 119. Id. at 818-19. 
 120. Id. at 816. 
 121. Id. at 822. 
 122. Id. at 819. 
 123. Mrs. Pritchard had never paid attention to the business; her husband ran the 
company until his death.  After he died, she apparently suffered from a form of acute 
depression, became bedridden, and began to drink heavily.  Id. at 819-20. 
 124. Id. at 819. 
 125. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 126. 432 A.2d at 826-29 (explaining that determining causation is a matter of both 
law and common sense). 
 127. Id. at 823 (citing Campbell, 62 N.J. Eq. at 443). 
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exercise their managerial authority.  By the latter part of the 
twentieth century the courts had also begun to limit the application 
of the business judgment rule in other important respects.  For 
example, in Joy v. North128 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit expounded at length on the rule in the context of a 
duty of care action against the directors of Citytrust Bank.  On the 
recommendation of Citytrust’s chief executive officer (“CEO”), the 
bank’s board had repeatedly approved extensions of significant 
amounts of credit to a real estate developer with whom the CEO had 
a personal relationship.129  When the developer defaulted, thereby 
inflicting a major loss on the bank, a group of shareholders filed a 
derivative action claiming that the directors had breached their duty 
of care by approving the loans.130  The court rejected the defendant 
directors’ argument that their actions were protected by the business 
judgment rule, explaining that: 
the business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which 
justify its existence.  Thus, it does not apply in cases, e.g., in which 
the corporation lacks a business purpose, is tainted by a conflict of 
interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or 
results from an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight 
or supervision.131 
In ruling that Citytrust’s directors could be liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty, the Joy Court rebuffed the outside directors’ protest 
that “they had neither information nor reasonable notice of the 
problems raised by the [loan] transactions.”132  The court 
admonished: 
[L]ack of knowledge is not necessarily a defense, if it is the result of 
an abdication of directional responsibility.  Directors who willingly 
allow others to make major decisions affecting the future of the 
corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may not 
defend on their lack of knowledge, for that ignorance itself is a 
breach of fiduciary duty.133 
Joy v. North is significant because it is one of the few cases in which a 
court upheld a challenge to a board decision for reasons grounded 
more in substantive irrationality than procedural shortcomings.  
Although the law of Connecticut, rather than that of Delaware, 
governed the decision, Joy v. North offered an inkling of major issues 
                                                          
 128. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 129. Id. at 894-95. 
 130. Id. at 882. 
 131. Id. at 886 (citations omitted). 
 132. Id. at 896. 
 133. Id. (citations omitted). 
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about to surface in corporate fiduciary law—outside directors’ 
ignorance, inattention, or undue deference to insiders.  The court’s 
willingness to wade into these waters also presaged the course the 
Delaware Supreme Court would soon take in trying to prevent the 
business judgment rule from wholly swallowing the duty of care.  
Appropriately, the real storm over the parameters of the modern duty 
of care broke in Delaware. 
3. Smith v. Van Gorkom:  the judicial earthquake and its aftermath 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,134 the Delaware Supreme Court halted the 
progressive advance of the business judgment rule and attempted to 
breathe new life into the duty of care.  In September of 1980, Jerome 
Van Gorkom, Trans Union’s chairman and CEO, asked the board to 
consider an offer from Pritzker Corp. to purchase Trans Union stock 
at a price of $55 per share.135  The offer ostensibly came with a very 
tight time limitation that required prompt action by Trans Union’s 
board.136  The directors approved the cash-out merger proposal on 
the basis of Van Gorkom’s twenty-minute account of his negotiations 
with Pritzker representatives.137  The directors did not review any 
documentation of the proposed terms and underlying financial data 
or consult the company’s investment advisers.138  Trans Union’s 
directors were well qualified and highly accomplished business 
people.139  Nevertheless, when a shareholder derivative action 
challenging the board’s decision reached the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the majority decided to put some bite back into the duty of 
care.  The court held Trans Union’s directors personally liable for 
gross negligence in breach of the duty of care on the ground that 
they had failed to inform themselves properly before voting to 
proceed with the merger.140   
The analytical portion of the majority’s opinion in Van Gorkom 
begins with a standard obeisance to the business judgment rule.  The 
                                                          
 134. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 135. Id. at 867. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 868. 
 138. Id. at 868-69 (observing that such documents were not even available for 
review prior to the meeting). 
 139. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (noting that the Trans Union directors 
“had collectively been employed by the Company for 116 years and had 68 years of 
combined experience as directors”). 
 140. Id. at 881.  The directors were also held liable for gross negligence in 
approving amendments to the merger proposal and for relinquishing their freedom 
to recommend to the stockholders that the merger offer be turned down.  Id. at 883-
84, 887-88. 
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court cited Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado141 as a reminder that “[t]he 
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and 
free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware 
directors.”142  Subsequently, however, in a decided twist on the Illinois 
Appellate Court’s deferential language in Shlensky, Delaware’s highest 
court admonished that “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires 
more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud.”143  The court 
continued: “[r]epresentation of the financial interests of others 
imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests 
and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type 
and under the circumstances present here.”144  After clarifying that a 
failure to make an informed business judgment violated the duty of 
care rather than the duty of loyalty, the court confirmed that “gross 
negligence” was the relevant standard in determining whether the 
directors breached that duty.145  It then proceeded to analyze the facts 
and circumstances of the Trans Union merger, concluding that “the 
Board lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed 
business judgment as to the fairness of [Pritzker’s offer] for sale of 
the Company.146 
The court’s decision shook the foundations of the corporate 
world.147  As the decision’s aftershocks rippled through boardrooms 
across the country, Delaware’s legislature reacted quickly to this 
perceived judicial invasion of the realm of business professionals.148  
Within months, both chambers of the General Assembly passed, and 
the governor signed, legislation amending Delaware’s corporate code 
in an effort to undo the damage wrought by what a dissenting justice 
called the Van Gorkom majority’s “comedy of errors.”149 
C. Protecting Directors from the Courts:  Delaware’s Exculpation Statute 
Delaware’s new statute, codified as section 102(b)(7) of the state’s 
General Corporation Law, eviscerated Van Gorkom by permitting 
corporations to limit, or even eliminate, the personal liability of 
directors for almost all breaches of the duty of care.150  The legislative 
history of the statute is sparse, but it is clear that the legislature’s 
                                                          
 141. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
 142. 488 A.2d at 872 (citing Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 872-73 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 146. Id. at 878. 
 147. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 18, at 466 n.58. 
 148. Id. at 466-67. 
 149. 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). 
 150. For the text of section 102(b)(7), see infra text accompanying note 153. 
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objective was to undo a decision that many believed would discourage 
qualified people from serving as corporate directors.151  There was 
also concern that Van Gorkom would result in a prohibitive increase in 
the cost of directors’ and officers’ insurance.  The new statute 
responded to these anxieties.152  Section 102(b)(7) provides in 
pertinent part that a Delaware corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation may contain: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a 
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary 
damages for  breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that 
such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: 
(i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in 
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of  law; (iii) under section 174 of this Title [unlawful 
distributions]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit.153 
The structure of the provision is significant.  In keeping with 
Delaware’s traditional approach to corporate law, section 102(b)(7) 
is essentially an enabling statute that permits corporations to add 
provisions to their charters protecting directors from personal 
liability for failure to fulfill their fiduciary duties.154  The statute, 
however, precludes limitation of liability for breach of the duty of 
loyalty, intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, reaping 
improper personal benefit from transactions (presumably a subset of 
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., Hintmann, supra note 10, at 586-88; E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on 
Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 
12 WASH. U. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2003) (commenting on the obvious relationship 
between Van Gorkom and the enactment of the Delaware statute). 
 152. See RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYUN, FOLK ON 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102, n.55 and accompanying text (2001); see 
also Bruner, Christopher M., “Good Faith,” State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of 
Director Liability in Corporate Law (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 05-
19, 2005), available at   http://ssrn.com/abstract=832944. 
 153. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006). 
 154. For a discussion of Delaware’s corporation law as an enabling statute, see 
What Happened in Delaware, supra note 5, at 1411.  See also E. Norman Veasey, Should 
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice Versa?, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179-80 (2001) (positing that the flexibility of the Delaware 
enabling model makes it superior to mandatory corporate law rules); E. Norman 
Veasey, Essay, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Principles, 56 S.M.U. L. REV.  
2135, 2139-40 (2003) (explaining that Delaware’s statute is based upon trust that 
executives will act rationally and with integrity in pursuing the best interests of 
stockholders); E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron 
WorldCom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 843 (2003) (arguing that the 
most effective way to protect stockholders is to ensure directors’ independence).  In 
addition, as former Chief Justice Veasey observes, Delaware’s corporate code 
“create[s] only a skeletal framework. . . .  The ‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is 
judge-made.”  Id. 
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disloyal actions), or making unlawful distributions of corporate 
assets.155  These exclusions are fairly straightforward.  The exception 
“for acts or omissions not in good faith” set forth in the first part of 
subsection (ii), however, is less so, because the concept of “good 
faith” has always been somewhat amorphous in corporate law.156  It is 
this language, rather than the disloyalty exclusion in subsection (i), 
that provided the impetus for the evolution of the “new” good faith 
and its recognition by the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney V.  
While section 102(b)(7) does not bar injunctive relief,157 the 
exculpatory provisions it authorizes create an effective release from 
personal liability for monetary damages as a result of directorial 
carelessness—both negligence and gross negligence.158  
Consequently, section 102(b)(7) sounded the death knell of the duty 
of care as an effective fiduciary standard constraining the conduct of 
corporate directors.159 
Other jurisdictions were quick to follow Delaware’s lead.  In the 
course of the succeeding year, more than thirty states enacted similar 
provisions, and all fifty states eventually did so.160  In the blink of an 
eye, virtually every major corporation accepted the invitation to 
include an exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorporation.161  
The corporate world heaved a collective sigh of relief—at least until 
the Caremark and Columbia/HCA fiascos made front-page news 
across the country in the mid 1990s.162  These corporate scandals 
                                                          
 155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i), (iii)-(iv)(2006). 
 156. See Griffith, supra note 5 (pre-Disney description of the concept of good faith 
as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard).  In its decision in Emerald 
Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641 
(Del. 2003), the court noted the difficulty of interpreting section 102(b)(7) because 
it “creat[es] unnecessary conceptual confusion.”  Id. at *39 n.133.   
   157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (permitting exculpation of directors 
from personal liability without limitation of injunctive relief). 
   158.  Id. 
   159.  See Sale, supra note 18, at 458, 482-94 (suggesting that Delaware’s legislature 
“abdicat[ed] part of its role in regulating corporate governance. . . . [by] allow[ing] 
companies, at the directors’ initiative, to exempt [directors] from damages for failing 
to adhere to their duty of care . . .”).  For a discussion of the general decline of the 
potency of the duty of care in Delaware, see Stephen J. Lubbin & Alana J. Darnell, 
Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L 589, 591 (2006) (describing the duty of care 
as “a rule that now requires little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of 
relevant data”). 
   160. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of 
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004); see also Spare the Rod, supra 
note 20, at 405 (highlighting trends in state law to limit director liability and 
suggesting that the SEC proved unable to address fully the shortcomings of state 
corporation law).   
   161. Disney IV,  907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
   162. As a result of its criminal conviction and associated civil liability, Caremark 
paid more than $160 million to the U.S. Government and other third parties. See 
infra Part II.A.2.a. 
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focused attention on the exceptions to the exculpatory language of 
section 102(b)(7), particularly the good faith proviso.  Subsequently, 
Enron and the spectacular corporate debacles that followed163 
intensified pressure to hold outside directors accountable for 
fiduciary lapses, and the brouhaha over Michael Ovitz’s exit from 
Disney provided an admirable vehicle for exploring the limits of the 
good faith exception. 
The culmination of the Disney litigation—the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s June 2006 decision—offers hope that the “new” good faith 
will evolve to fill a significant gap in contemporary corporate law.  If 
the courts choose to confine its application as an enforceable legal 
standard quite narrowly, the promise of the new good faith will soon 
evaporate.  But, if the courts utilize the Disney standard to hold 
directors accountable for actually fulfilling the responsibilities they 
knowingly accept in return for the payment, prestige and perquisites 
that accompany seats on major corporate boards,164 the new good 
faith has the potential to become a landmark in the evolution of 
standards defining the conduct of corporate directors in Delaware 
and—because of Delaware’s importance in American corporate law—
throughout the entire United States. 
II. THE “NEW” GOOD FAITH 
The Disney standard is the product of twenty years of development, 
beginning with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom165 and the Delaware General Assembly’s enactment of 
section 102(b)(7) in reaction to that decision.166  The importance of 
Disney V in this context167 lies in its recognition that directors of a 
Delaware corporation have a fiduciary obligation to act in good faith 
that does not conflate good faith with the duty of care, yet goes 
beyond the mere obligation not to act with subjectively improper 
motivation.168  This richer obligation imposes upon directors an 
                                                          
   163. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law:  Enron, 
Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (discussing the 
impact of the Enron collapse in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks). 
   164.    As Professor Johnson points out, the fiduciary duty of loyalty has the 
potential to function across a broad spectrum “ranging from a minimalist aspect of 
nonbetrayal to the more full-bodied dimension of affirmative devotion.”  See Lyman 
Johnson, After Enron:  Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 27, 30 (2004) [hereinafter Loyalty Discourse]. 
 165. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  
 166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006). 
   167. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  For a complete list of the key decisions in 
the Disney litigation, see supra note 14. 
 168. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66-67.  
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affirmative duty to act where they have a known duty to do so.169  
Unfortunately, while it has noted this distinction, the Delaware 
Supreme Court, like the Chancery Court, has at least troubled the 
waters by using “bad faith” to define “good faith” within the meaning 
of section 102(b)(7)(ii).  Consequently, there is a significant risk that 
the “failure-to-act test” could be equated with an older, different test, 
namely a motivational inquiry.  This Part argues that it would be 
clearer to focus on an absence of good faith than to require a finding 
of the presence of  bad faith, given the baggage the latter term brings 
with it.  In any event, it is essential to articulate the required finding 
clearly if the new good faith is to realize its full potential. 
A. Closing the Accountability Gap 
1. Van Gorkom and section 102(b)(7) 
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that there 
was no suggestion that the actions of Trans Union’s directors 
constituted self-dealing or that they had not made their decision in 
good faith.170  The court understood the case to implicate the duty of 
care, not the duty of loyalty.171  The primary importance of the case 
for the new good faith arises not from the decision itself, but from 
the Legislature’s response—section 102(b)(7)’s grant of permission 
to Delaware corporations to shield their directors from liability for 
money damages for breach of the duty of care, except for “acts or 
omissions not in good faith.”172  The practical effect of the statute was 
to protect directors and officers from liability for both negligent and 
grossly negligent conduct.173  This legal regime effectively neutralized 
                                                          
 169. Id.; Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6-*7 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006). 
  170.  488 A.2d at 873. 
   171. Id. at 872-73.  More particularly, the court held that the duty of care imposes 
on directors the obligation “to act in an informed and deliberate manner,” and the 
duty is breached where directors are found to have acted in a grossly negligent 
fashion.  Id. at 873. 
 172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2006).  Delaware has a similar 
exclusion with respect to indemnification.  See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW tit. 8, § 145 
(2006). 
 173.  Professor Eisenberg has argued that standards of conduct and standards of 
judicial review diverge in the law of corporate governance.  He suggests that the duty 
of care sets forth a standard of conduct for directors, but that the business judgment 
rule provides a (much less-stringent) standard of review.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 52 
FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-49 (1993).  A section 102(b)(7) provision operates in a 
manner analogous to the business judgment rule:  it does not affect a director’s duty 
to act with care, but it denies courts the ability to impose personal monetary liability 
as a consequence of careless conduct.  While it is certainly true that business men 
and women have moral duties not encompassed by legal requirements, standards of 
review that are less stringent than standards of conduct make the standards of 
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the duty of care as a check on directorial negligence.  It was 
inherently unstable because it went too far.174 
2. The rise of the new good faith  
a. Caremark 
Although it is easy to view the rise of the new good faith as a 
response to the corporate scandals of the Enron-WorldCom era,175 the 
first major development was the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
landmark 1996 decision in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation.176  In Caremark, the parties asked the court to approve the 
settlement of a shareholders’ derivative suit that arose after the 
company had been indicted in connection with health care fraud.  
Caremark agreed to settle with the government by pleading guilty to 
one count and paying criminal fines and civil claims in an amount 
totaling approximately $165 million.177  The directors had not known 
about, and hence had not been in a position to stop, the 
wrongdoing.178  The question was whether they should have known. 
On the application to approve the settlement, the court’s 
responsibility was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.179  The complaint did “not charge either director 
self-dealing or the more difficult loyalty-type problems arising from 
cases of suspect director motivation, such as entrenchment or sale of 
                                                          
conduct legally irrelevant.  See also Gregory Scott Crespi, Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law:  The Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671 
(2004) (criticizing the standard of conduct/standard of review distinction). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 150.  
 175. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 7-8 (“The duty of good faith emerged in an 
environment of sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of scandals—
including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, celebrity 
insider trading, and corruption in the IPO market—drew American corporate 
governance into question and plunged previously settled questions into heated 
debate.”). 
 176. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Soon after the enactment of section 
102(b)(7), in  Barkan v. Amsted Indust., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989), the Delaware 
Supreme Court approved the settlement of litigation involving a management-
sponsored leveraged buyout.  In discussing the directors’ good faith belief that the 
shareholders were getting the best price, even in the absence of a market test, the 
court stated that “the crucial element supporting a finding of good faith is 
knowledge.”  Id. at 1288.  Because Barkan is an acquisition case, the reference to 
good faith could point to what this Article calls the old good faith, namely, that the 
directors’ action did not violate the duty of loyalty for being self-interested.  Yet, it 
also contains a hint, upon which later cases would build, that “good faith is more 
closely associated with diligence, or the duty of care.”  Ellen Taylor, New and 
Unjustified Restrictions on Delaware Directors’ Authority, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 837, 881 
(1996). 
 177. 698 A.2d at 965 n.10. 
 178. Id. at 971-72. 
 179. Id. at 961, 966-67. 
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control contexts.”180  The court was not asked to rule directly on the 
question whether the plaintiffs’ case was fatally weak because of the 
presence of a section 102(b)(7) provision in the corporate certificate, 
but it is clear that the Chancellor understood that this issue was 
potentially present.181  Nevertheless, the court discussed the directors’ 
duties, in part, in light of good faith.  Chancellor Allen distinguished 
between two kinds of breach-of-duty-of-care cases—liability arising 
either from a board decision that was ill-advised or negligent, or from 
a board’s unconsidered failure to act where action would have 
prevented the loss.182  In the first category, the business judgment rule 
protected decisions that were the product of a process that was either 
rational or “employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate 
interests.”183 
In the second category, the Chancellor determined that the board 
had a duty to “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s 
information and reporting system [was] in concept and design 
adequate to assure the board that appropriate information [would] 
come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary 
operations, so that it [could] satisfy its responsibility.”184  Without 
deciding the impact of the presence of a section 102(b)(7) 
exemption in the certificate, the Chancellor opined that failure to 
attempt in good faith to assure that such a system was in place “under 
some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for losses. . . .”185  
In the Caremark matter, however, the Chancellor noted that “the 
corporation’s information systems appear[ed] to have represented a 
good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts,”186 and there was 
no significant evidence “of a sustained failure to exercise their 
oversight function.”187  Consequently, the Chancellor approved the 
proposed settlement, even though it “provide[d] very modest 
benefits.”188 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 967. 
 181. Caremark’s predecessor, Baxter International, Inc., had amended its certificate 
of incorporation to include the liability exclusion authorized by section 102(b)(7).  
As a result, the Chancellor opined that the claims asserted in the case “likely were 
susceptible to a motion to dismiss in all events.”  Id. at 971. 
 182. Id. at 967. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 970 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id.  The court addressed the potential issue under section 102(b)(7), see id. 
at 970 n.27. 
 186. Id. at  971.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 972. 
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b. McCall 
McCall v. Scott189 took the Caremark analysis a step further.  McCall 
was a shareholder derivative action in which the plaintiffs sought 
damages from current and former directors for a number of 
transgressions, including failing to prevent, and establishing policies 
that sometimes promoted, widespread health care fraud.190  The 
plaintiffs alleged breach of the duty of care in connection with this 
claim.191  Consistent with then-existing Delaware case law, they 
necessarily alleged that the directors’ conduct was grossly negligent.192  
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, a Delaware company, 
countered by citing its inclusion of the exculpatory provision 
authorized by section 102(b)(7) in its certificate of incorporation.193   
In McCall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
applying Delaware law, had to resolve the question that Chancellor 
Allen identified, but did not decide in Caremark:  the legal effect of 
the good faith exception for directors of a corporation that had 
placed a section 102(b)(7) liability shield in its certificate194  The 
McCall court ruled that the good faith exception contained in section 
102(b)(7)(ii) was not merely a hortatory cry for ethically appropriate 
conduct, but a provision with real bite.  The court, therefore, allowed 
the plaintiffs to maintain an action alleging reckless misconduct on 
the part of directors and officers of Columbia/HCA.195 
Section 102(b)(7)(ii) prohibits corporations from exempting 
directors from personal ability for acts or omissions either “not in 
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of the law.”196  Because the facts alleged in McCall suggested 
that the directors might have acted recklessly, but not intentionally, 
the plaintiffs argued that the statutory phrase “intentional 
misconduct” should be interpreted as encompassing recklessness.197  
The court rejected this contention, but it accepted the argument that 
allegations of reckless misconduct brought the case within the 
statute’s good faith exception “[t]o the extent that recklessness 
                                                          
 189. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (“McCall I”), amended on denial of reh’g by McCall 
v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (“McCall II”). 
 190. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 813-14. 
 191. Id. at 813, 817-19, 824-26.  They also accused directors and officers of illegal 
insider trading in violation of the duty of loyalty.  Id. at 813. 
 192. Id. at 817 n.9; see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 193. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 818. 
 194. Id. at 818-19. 
 195. Id. 
 196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 197. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 818. 
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involves a conscious disregard of a known risk.”198  As the court stated 
in its amended opinion, “while it is true that duty of care claims 
alleging only grossly negligent conduct are precluded by a § 
102(b)(7) waiver provision, it appears that duty of care claims based 
on reckless or intentional misconduct are not.”199  The federal court 
relied on a treatise on Delaware corporate law that stated:  “To the 
extent that recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a known 
risk, it could be argued that such an approach is not one taken in 
good faith and thus could not be liability exempted under the new 
statute.”200  On this basis, the court refused to dismiss the action 
against the defendant directors despite the exculpatory provision in 
the corporation’s certificate.201 
The court held that “[u]nder Delaware law, the duty of good faith 
may be breached where a director consciously disregards his duties to 
the corporation, thereby causing its stockholders to suffer.”202  The 
court did not have to decide whether the statute protected directors 
from liability for unconsidered inaction.  It found the allegations of 
recklessness sufficient to fall within the statute.  By embracing 
recklessness as a basis for a breach of good faith capable of 
eliminating section 102(b)(7) protection, the court opened the door 
to a question quite different from the motivational inquiry required 
by earlier ideas of good faith.203 
B. Disney, the Old Good Faith and the New Good Faith 
During the late 1990s and the first years of the new century, a 
number of Delaware Chancery Court decisions explored the limits of 
the good faith exception to section 102(b)(7).  From time to time, 
the Delaware Supreme Court weighed in on related matters, but it 
did not have occasion to determine the nature or parameters of the 
                                                          
 198. Id.  The court’s reason was its belief that the Delaware Supreme Court would 
not interpret section 102(b)(7) in this way. 
 199. McCall II, 250 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 200. Id. at 1000-01 (quoting 1 BALLOTTI & FINKLESTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.29, at 4-116 to 4-116.1 (3d ed., Supp. 
2000)). 
 201. Id. at 1001. 
 202. Id., citing Nagy v. Bistricer, No. Civ.A. 18017, 2000 WL 1759860, at *3 n.2 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 22, 2000).  
  203.  See id. at 1001 (“[W]e find that [plaintiffs] have alleged a conscious disregard 
of known risks, which conduct, if proven, cannot have been undertaken in good 
faith.”); see also In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 
(7th Cir. 2003) (applying an Illinois statute modeled on section 102(b)(7) in 
shareholders’ derivative suit and following McCall’s interpretation of good faith in a 
case determining a question of failure to plead demand futility). 
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obligation.204  It was in the Disney litigation that the new good faith 
took center stage. 
All of the events relevant to the Disney dispute took place within a 
single year, although the litigation they generated spanned nearly 
ten.  The driving force behind the hiring and then the firing of 
Michael Ovitz was his long-time friend, Disney CEO Michael Eisner.205  
Ovitz’s performance at Disney was abysmal.206  Yet the compensation 
Ovitz received for this unsatisfactory service, including his 
termination payout, amounted to approximately $140 million.207  As 
Chancellor Chandler, who tried the case, saw it, this was an instance 
of “an imperial CEO” operating with a “supine or passive board.”208  
Shareholders sought to recover against the directors—Eisner for 
orchestrating and the others, including the outside directors, for 
permitting—this chain of events to occur.  The gravamen of the 
allegations against the directors, other than Eisner, was that they had 
entirely neglected their duties.  The trial court found that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove their allegations.  The Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed.209 
It is crucial to note that the plaintiffs did not allege that the 
defendant directors acted on the basis of improper motivation.  The 
key issue at trial was about dereliction of duty.210  This distinction is 
important.  Improper motivation traditionally falls within the rubric 
of subjective bad faith; dereliction of duty does not.  The two 
concepts differ sharply.  The old good faith addresses improper 
motivation; the new good faith addresses dereliction of duty, 
specifically, an “intentional failure to act in the face of a known duty 
to act.”211  In the words of the Disney V court, such disregard of duty 
constitutes “a nonexculpable, nonindemnifiable violation of the 
fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”212  To understand the new good 
faith and the role it can play in the evolving law of corporate 
governance requires a clear understanding of the difference between 
the two.  The following discussion examines Disney V’s new standard 
in the context of discussions of good faith generally and then 
                                                          
   204.   See cases cited supra note 19. 
   205. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 35-42 (Del. 2006).  
   206. Id. at 42-46. 
   207. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).  Ovitz’s severance payout alone was 
approximately $130 million.  Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 27.  
   208. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 761 n.487. 
   209. Id. at 778-79. 
   210. Id. at 753-56. 
   211.   Id. at 755. 
   212. 906 A.2d at 66. 
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explores in greater detail the doctrine referred to as the “old” good 
faith. 
1. Good faith:  one doctrine or two? 
 In Disney V, the Delaware Supreme Court began its discussion of 
good faith by stating that “at least three different categories of 
fiduciary behavior are candidates for the ‘bad faith’ pejorative 
label.”213  One of these categories—the second in the court’s list—is 
“lack of due care—that is, fiduciary action taken by reason of gross 
negligence and without any malevolent intent.”214  The court easily 
rejected an approach that would read section 102(b)(7) to permit 
holding directors liable for grossly negligent violations of the duty of 
care.  Although the court did not cite Van Gorkom in its discussion, 
the court stated that allowing the statutory “good faith” exception to 
permit directors to be held personally liable for gross negligence 
“would eviscerate the protections accorded to directors by the 
General Assembly’s  adoption of Section 102(b)(7).”215 
The other two categories the court discussed, as well as the 
differences between them, are central to the analysis here.  Both are 
viable ideas in corporate law.  The first is “subjective bad faith,” that 
is, fiduciary misconduct based on improper motivation. The second 
encompasses “fiduciary conduct . . . which does not involve disloyalty 
(as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpable than gross 
negligence, [and therefore] should be proscribed.”216  Before 
studying the difference between these two different formulations of 
good faith, it is helpful to examine certain other bedrock difficulties 
with the concept. 
Despite its well-developed status in both contract217 and insurance 
law,218 good faith has bred confusion in corporate law in two different 
ways.  First, in the view of one commentator, “the meaning of good 
faith in 102(b)(7) remains a mystery.”219  Far from being a coherent 
concept that usefully provides a remedy for directorial dereliction of 
duty, from this perspective good faith has been “used as a loose 
rhetorical device that courts can wield to find viability or enjoin 
actions that do not quite fit within established doctrinal categories.”220  
                                                          
   213. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64. 
   214. Id. 
   215. Id. at 65. 
   216. Id. 
   217. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 753 n.449.  
   218. See generally STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY AND DAMAGES 
(1977).  
   219. Griffith, supra note 5, at 14. 
   220. Id. at 34. 
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Second, prior to Disney V, Delaware courts and commentators 
disagreed about whether good faith constituted a third, independent 
fiduciary duty,221 or whether it should be understood as “a subset or 
‘subsidiary’ requirement that is subsumed within the duty of loyalty, 
as distinguished from being a compartmentally distinct fiduciary duty 
of equal dignity with the two bedrock duties of loyalty and due 
care.”222  As Chancellor Chandler put it in Disney IV, “[t]he fiduciary 
duties owed by directors of a Delaware corporation are the duties of 
care and loyalty.  Of late, much discussion among the bench, bar, and 
academics alike, has surrounded a so-called third fiduciary duty, that 
of good faith.”223 
At one level, Disney V settled this latter dispute by recognizing good 
faith as a fiduciary obligation qualitatively different from the duty of 
care and the traditional interpretation of the duty of loyalty,224  
Nevertheless, despite its admonition that “[t]he good faith required 
of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care and 
loyalty,”225 the Disney V court  left open the question whether the duty 
it recognized could serve as an independent basis for “direct” 
imposition of liability.226  The court’s subsequent opinion in Stone has 
now described the duty of good faith, at least in the context of 
allegations of claims of Caremark-type oversight failure, as a 
component of the “fundamental duty of loyalty,”227  While the 
doctrinal location of the new good faith has significance,228 the key 
point for purposes of this discussion is that there are two ways in 
which good faith operates in Delaware corporate law.  The first, the 
obligation we refer to as the old good faith, functions generally as an 
ethical evaluation of the subjective motivation frequently at issue in 
traditional duty of loyalty cases.  The second, the duty we call the new 
good faith applies where directors  consciously fail to comply with 
known duties, and it can be identified through the application of 
                                                          
     221.   See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
(referring to “triads’ of fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty and care”).  See also sources 
cited supra note 29 and infra note 236. 
     222.   Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 7, 2001), vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (2001), remanded to No. 9700, 2003 WL 
21003437 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003). 
     223.   Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 745.  See sources cited infra note 229. 
     224.   Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 63-66 (Del. 2006).  
     225.   Id. (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755).  
     226.   Id. at 67, n.112 
     227.   Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006). 
     228.   Id.; Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 n.109 
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objective criteria.  Doctrinal confusion arises because the term “good 
faith” functions differently in the two contexts.229 
2. The old good faith:  good faith as the opposite of subjective bad faith 
Before turning to the claim before it, the Disney V court first 
discussed the category of conduct “involv[ing] so-called ‘subjective 
bad faith,’ that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to 
do harm.”230  This conduct, the court explained, “constitutes classic, 
quintessential bad faith. . . .”231 in that it entails “‘the conscious doing 
of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . .  a 
state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill 
will.’”232  The Disney V court included within this category instances in 
which a fiduciary prefers his or her own interests, or the interests of 
related persons, over the best interests of the corporation, terming 
this conduct as “disloyalty in the classic sense.”233   
The opposite of such improperly motivated conduct is good faith, 
but it is the old good faith.  There are two critical characteristics of 
                                                          
   229. Even within a single legal discipline, sometimes the same term may have 
different meanings.  For example, in constitutional law, due process means 
something quite different when it is substantive rather than procedural.  The starting 
place for an analysis of the Delaware courts’ recent iterations of corporate directors’ 
duty to act in good faith is Hillary Sale’s 2004 article.  See Sale, supra note 18.  After a 
meticulous examination of the cases, Professor Sale argues that good faith constitutes 
a third, independent fiduciary duty.  Id.  In a very recent article, Professor Eisenberg 
likewise concludes that good faith constitutes a fiduciary duty distinct from the duties 
of care and loyalty.  Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 74-75.   
For other discussions of good faith predating Disney V, see Griffith, supra note 6, at 6 
(suggesting that good faith functions less as a substantive standard and more as a 
rhetorical device used to increase judicial review of corporate board decisions); 
Robert Baker, In Re Walt Disney:  What it Means to the Definition of Good Faith, 
Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 261 
(2004-2005) (arguing that Disney II aligns the duty of good faith with the traditional 
duty of care, thereby diminishing the usefulness of exculpatory provisions); Matthew 
R. Berry, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal Liability?  
Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004) (noting that 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporate Code protects directors from personal 
liability for gross negligence and reckless behavior); Jaclyn J. Janssen, Note, In re 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation:  Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too Much 
Faith in the Duty of Good Faith, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1573; Tara L. Dunn, The Developing 
Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct:  Are Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate 
Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531 (2005) 
(chronicling the Delaware courts’ progression toward imposing personal liability on 
directors through the duty of good faith); John L. Reed & Matt Niederman, “Good 
Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporate Law 
as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004) (analyzing the meaning of “not in good 
faith” with regard to Delaware’s exculpation statute). 
  230.   Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64.  
  231.   Id.  
  232.  Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64 n.102 (quoting McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 
1036 (Del. Ch. 2004)).  
  233.  Id. at 65.  See infra note 239. 
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the old good faith.  First, good faith in this sense is most typically 
understood in terms of its opposite, subjective bad faith.  As the court 
noted in Disney IV, “at least in the corporate fiduciary context, it is 
probably easier to define bad faith rather than good faith.”234  This 
understanding echoes Professor Summers’ venerable observation in 
the context of contract law that good faith is “a phrase which has no 
general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude 
many heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”235  Second, as the Disney V 
court’s language makes clear, the terms good faith and bad faith in 
this sense function as a description of an actor’s motivations, rather 
than an objective account of his or her actions.  Their character, 
therefore, is “subjective.”236  Thus, the old good faith was not at issue 
in Disney V with respect to the conduct of the outside directors. 
The old good faith is a concept fundamentally defined by the 
negation of its negation—that is, good faith is an absence of 
subjective bad faith.  A director, therefore, is said to act in good faith, 
in this sense, if his or her motivations are neither dishonest, deceptive 
nor otherwise improper.  Because the old good faith is principally a 
concept related to motivation, it is not surprising that good faith “is 
not a well-developed area of our corporate fiduciary law.”237  The old 
good faith has not bred “a carefully delineated mode of analysis,”238 
because it has not had to do so.239 
The new articulation of good faith that began to attract attention 
following Caremark is quite different.  Far from commanding an 
absence of improper motivation, it should be understood to require 
positive conduct measured by objective criteria. In Disney V, the 
Delaware Supreme Court, like the Chancery Court decision it 
upheld, defined this concept in terms of bad faith.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
 234. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 753.  
 235. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968).  The court then 
contrasts this state of affairs with the abundance of jurisprudence regarding good 
faith in contractual contexts.  Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 754 n.449.  The inapplicability 
of bad faith to the duty at issue in the Disney trial is discussed infra Part III. 
 236. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64.  In Desert Equities v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity 
Fund, II, LP, 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993), the court quoted Black’s Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1983) to define bad faith as “not simply bad judgment or 
negligence, but rather [as] impl[ying] the conscious doing of a wrong because of 
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. . . . ” 
 237. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63. 
 238. Griffith, supra note 5, at 7. 
 239. Bad faith motivation in corporate law generally has been discussed in 
connection with cases alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  While the 
word “loyalty” carries a broad range of positive normative connotations in ordinary 
speech, in the law of corporate governance it generally has played a more narrowly-
focused role.  See generally Loyalty Discourse, supra note 164.   
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required showing of bad faith conduct associated with the new good 
faith encompasses a failure to act in accordance with known 
directorial duties rather than the presence of subjectively bad 
motives.  In a passage in Disney V reiterated in Stone, the court also left 
open the possibility that “[t]here may be other examples of bad faith 
yet to be proved or alleged” in connection with the new formulation 
of good faith.240  How the doctrine will unfold in the courts is 
impossible to predict, but it seems possible that corporate law is on 
the threshold of the development of a new doctrine that could have a 
real cutting edge in terms of what officers and directors must do to 
avoid liability.  The following sections discuss the role of the good 
faith standard in the Disney litigation. 
3. The Disney opinions—the core of the new good faith 
a. Disney II—allegations that state a good faith claim 
Disney II241 took an important step beyond McCall in establishing the 
existence of a positive new good faith duty, and not just because it 
was the decision of a Delaware court.  The Court of Chancery held 
that allegations of directors’ sustained inattention to duty—i.e., 
“knowing or intentional lack of due care . . . suggest[ing] that the 
Disney directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed 
to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to 
Disney and its stockholders—were sufficient to permit the plaintiffs’ 
action to go forward.242 
Procedurally, the Disney matter came before the Chancellor on the 
defendant directors’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint that 
the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiffs to file in its decision in 
Brehm v. Eisner.243  Initially, the plaintiffs had pled their case on the 
basis of alleged breaches of the duties of loyalty and care.244  The 
Brehm court dismissed the duty of loyalty claims after finding that the 
pertinent allegations were “not supported by well-pleaded facts” and 
                                                          
   240. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *5 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (citing 
Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.  
   241. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
   242. Id. at 278. 
   243. 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000). 
   244.  “[I]t appears from the [initial] Complaint that:  (a) the compensation and 
termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious, compared 
to Ovitz’ value to the Company; and (b) the processes of the boards of directors in 
dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment Agreement were 
casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory.”  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.  As such, “[t]his is a 
case about whether there should be personal liability of the directors of a Delaware 
corporation to the corporation for lack of due care in the decision-making process 
and for [the] waste of corporate assets.”  Id. at 255.   
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“were illogical and counterintuitive.”245  The court also dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ duty of care claims.  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court instructed the Chancellor to provide the plaintiffs with an 
opportunity to file an amended complaint repleading their 
allegations pertaining to conscious disregard of duty.246  It was in the 
plaintiffs’ interest to characterize the defendant directors’ behavior 
in terms of failures to act in good faith, thereby bringing their 
conduct outside the protective shield of the section 102(b)(7) 
exculpatory provision included in the company’s certificate of 
incorporation.  The result, in the apt words of former Delaware Chief 
Justice Veasey, was that a due care action “morphed into a ‘good 
faith’ case.247 
In refusing to dismiss the amended complaint in Disney II, 
Chancellor Chandler described the new complaint as charging the 
directors with an “ostrich-like” approach.248  The Chancellor read the 
amended complaint to claim that the defendants “consciously and 
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care 
about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”249  
Emphasizing that the plaintiffs alleged that the “directors knew that 
they were making material decisions without adequate information 
and without adequate deliberation,” the court held that such 
allegations sufficed to state a claim for a “breach of the directors’ 
obligation to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best 
interests . . . .”250  The directors were neither shielded from 
substantive liability by the business judgment rule nor entitled to the 
protection of section 102(b)(7).251  Accordingly, the Chancellor ruled 
in favor of the plaintiffs when the defendants moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint.252  The Chancellor’s decision calls to mind Judge 
Hand’s famous words:253  “[Directors] have an individual duty to keep 
themselves informed in some detail” about the affairs of the 
corporation, instead of allowing themselves “to be carried along 
as . . . figurehead[s].”254   
                                                          
   245.    See id. at 257; Disney I, 731 A.2d at 355-56. 
   246.   Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267.  
   247. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1441.  “Curiously,” as Chief Justice 
Veasey notes, “potential exoneration of directors under section 102(b)(7) was not 
discussed in that phase of the case.”  Id. at 1440 n.155. 
   248. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 288 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
   249. Id. at 289. 
   250. Id.  
   251. Id. at 289-90. 
   252. Id. 
   253. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).  
   254. Id. at 615. 
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b. Disney IV—plaintiffs’ failure to prove the directors’ conscious 
disregard of duty 
The lengthy trial of the claims against the Disney directors was 
probably the most celebrated, and widely-reported, corporate 
governance trial in American history—at least since the Dodge boys 
challenged Henry Ford  in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company255 nearly a 
century ago.  Disney IV is the painstaking analysis supporting the 
Chancellor’s decision in favor of the defendants.  Given the context, 
most of the opinion details “who did what” in the hiring and firing of 
Michael Ovitz.  What matters for purposes of the long run 
development of doctrine is the standard of conduct to which the 
court held the outside directors.  The question the court decided was 
whether the quantity and quality of the outside directors’ actions 
sufficed to constitute good faith performance of their duties.  The 
facts did not present a question of the ethical assessment of the 
directors’ motivations, connoted by the traditional use of the 
expression “bad faith.”  Rather, the court described the standard 
under which it was assessing the conduct of the various defendant 
directors as follows: “Upon long and careful consideration, I am of 
the opinion that the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious 
disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the 
only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in 
good faith.”256 
While evaluation of the court’s decision on the merits of the case is 
beyond the scope of this Article, Chancellor Chandler’s discussion of 
why two Disney directors, actor Sidney Poitier and publisher and 
former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Monica Lozano, were not 
liable is illustrative.  There was no dispute that both became involved 
in the matter late in the process of hiring Ovitz.257  The court assessed 
their liability by comparing their actions to those of the Trans Union 
                                                          
  255.  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
   256. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  The court then described such 
a dereliction of duty as conduct “disloyal to the corporation.”  Id. Chancellor 
Chandler, however, cited Van Gorkom in a footnote appended to the discussion.  Id. at 
n.460 (citing 488 A.2d 873).  Although Van Gorkom focused on the duty of care, see 
488 A.2d at 872-73 (“a director’s duty to exercise informed business judgment is in 
the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”), the 
Chancellor’s point was to hone in on the somewhat elusive aspects of fiduciary duty 
that he characterized as beyond the narrow parameters of either care or loyalty.  Id. 
at 755 & n.460.  At a later point in the opinion, the Chancellor also cited an article 
by Lyman Johnson suggesting that the duty of loyalty has the capacity to command a 
higher degree of faithfulness than generally required of corporate directors under 
prevailing legal standards.  Id. at 761, n.487.  See infra note 262. 
 257. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 766. 
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directors in Van Gorkom.258  The question the court was deciding, in 
other words, was whether Poitier and Lozano had fulfilled their 
affirmative duties as directors.  The court concluded that they were 
not liable because they “did not intentionally disregard a duty to act, 
nor did they bury their heads in the sand knowing a decision had to 
be made.”259 
c. Disney V—confirmation of the new good faith 
Disney V marks not only the last word in this protracted litigation, 
but also the seminal word in the development of the new good faith. 
Given the procedural posture, the Chancellor’s lengthy opinion, and 
its decision to affirm, the Delaware Supreme Court could have 
avoided providing much insight on the meaning of good faith.  
Fortunately, in Disney V the court had the wisdom to provide 
guidance to the bar, and to the corporate world by shining a light on 
a duty “shrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence.”260  Stone 
clarifies the Disney standard, but it does not change its essential  
character. 
In its decision, the Disney V court confirmed that corporate 
directors can be held accountable when they consciously disregard 
their responsibilities.  The court stated that “the universe of fiduciary 
misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e., 
preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or a related person 
to the interest of the corporation) or gross negligence.”261  The 
“vehicle . . . needed to address [conscious disregard of directorial 
duty] doctrinally . . . is the duty to act in good faith.”262  In working 
out the scope of the duty, the decision identified the difference 
between the old good faith and the new good faith.  In so doing, it 
recognized the difference between what it called “‘subjective bad 
faith,’ that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do 
harm,”263 and the “good faith . . . [of] all actions required by a true 
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of a corporation and its 
shareholders.264 
                                                          
 258. Id. at 767-70. 
 259.  Id. at 771. 
  260.    Id. at 754 (quoted in Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63 n.98). 
 261. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 64.  
 264. Id. at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755).  For discussion of the court’s 
three-fold analysis on this point, see text accompanying notes 214-215, supra.  The 
court also interpreted the use of good faith in the indemnification statute, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001)—the only other use of the phrase in the General 
Corporation Law—consistently with the distinction between negligent or grossly 
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The “new” good faith applies in cases “where corporate directors 
have no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in 
misconduct that is more culpable than simple inattention or failure 
to be informed of all facts material to the decision.” 265  The is true 
regardless of the directors’ motives. The Supreme Court quoted 
Chancellor Chandler in defining the duty: 
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not 
simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . discussed . . . above, but all 
action required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests 
of the corporation and its shareholders.  A failure to act in good 
faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally 
acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests 
of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to 
violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally 
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating 
conscious disregard for his duties.266 
Significantly, like Chancellor Chandler, the Delaware Supreme 
Court made it clear that this was an open-ended list.  It noted:  
“There may be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or 
alleged, but these three are the most salient.”267  The invitation to 
further doctrinal development is plain and entirely salutary.  It 
reflects the tradition developed in the corporate jurisprudence of 
Delaware and many other states of establishing a general approach to 
doctrine to be developed in subsequent case-by-case adjudication.268  
In a matter of months, the high court availed itself of its own 
invitation.   
                                                          
negligent violation of the duty of care and conduct that is not in good faith:  
“[u]nder Delaware statutory law a director or officer may be indemnified for liability 
(and litigation expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but 
not for a violation of the duty to act in good faith.”  Id. at 66.  
 265. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66. 
 266. Id. at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755).  Interestingly, although the 
court does not cite the language, this passage echoes the observation in Van Gorkom 
that a director’s “obligation does not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing.  But 
fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad 
faith or fraud.  Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a 
director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical 
eye in assessing information. . . .”  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 
1985). 
 267. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 756). 
 268. See, e.g., Corporate Universe, supra note 2, at 168-73 (asserting that corporate 
jurisprudence evolves as a “function of the development of the common law 
reflecting changing business morés and sharper pleading in corporate litigation”). 
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d. The Stone clarification 
In November 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Stone v. Ritter.269  Stone involved a shareholders’ 
derivative action against present and former directors of the 
AmSouth Bancorporation.  The plaintiffs filed a Caremark action 
alleging that AmSouth’s directors breached their duty to act in good 
faith by failing to put in place monitoring systems adequate to enable 
them to learn of illegal conduct on the part of branch bank 
employees that ultimately required the corporation to pay fines and 
penalties of $50 million.270  Finding that the plaintiffs had conceded 
the absence of any basis for concluding that the directors knew or 
should have known of the misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court 
upheld the Chancellor’s dismissal of the complaint “for failure to 
excuse demand by alleging particularized facts that created reason to 
doubt whether the directors had acted in good faith in exercising 
their oversight responsibilities.”271   
In reaching its decision, the court noted that “the Caremark 
standard for so-called ‘oversight’ liability draws heavily upon the 
concept of director failure to act in good faith . . . consistent with the 
definition(s) of bad faith recently approved by this court in its recent 
Disney decision.”272  After holding that the Chancery Court had 
utilized the proper standard in evaluating the plaintiffs’ complaint 
against the AmSouth directors, the high court proceeded to clarify 
the operation of good faith in Caremark oversight actions.  Noting the 
Disney V court’s reservation of the specific question whether good 
faith is an independent duty, the court explained that “a failure to act 
in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct 
imposition of fiduciary liability . . . [but] ‘is a subsidiary element[,] 
i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”273  The court 
continued:  “It follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in 
the sense described in Disney [V] and Caremark, is essential to 
establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that 
conduct is the duty of loyalty.”274   
The court derived two doctrinal consequences from its analysis.  
“First, although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a 
                                                          
   269.   No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006). 
   270. Id. at *1. 
   271. Id. at *9.  The court admonished that “good faith exercise of oversight 
responsibility may not invariably prevent employees from violating criminal laws, or 
from causing the corporation to incur significant financial liability, or both. . . .”  Id. 
   272. Id. at *5 (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d 27).  
   273.   Id. at *6. (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 & n.112). 
   274. Id. 
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triad of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty,” it 
is not “an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing 
as the duties of care and loyalty.”275 Second, however, the court 
emphasized that the fiduciary duty of loyalty “is not limited to cases 
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest;  
it also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good 
faith.”276  The court explicitly admonished that “[w]here directors fail 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty 
of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good 
faith.”277  
The outcome in Stone is consistent with this analysis.  There was 
nothing to support a sustained oversight failure or conscious 
disregard of duty on the part of AmSouth’s directors.  In fact, they 
had implemented significant compliance and monitoring 
procedures.  As the court noted, the plaintiffs appeared to rest their 
claims on the failure of the monitoring system to prevent the illegal 
conduct rather than on directorial inattention, let alone conscious 
disregard, of this important responsibility.278  
A potential problem with Stone is that, like the Disney V opinion it 
clarifies, it poses a risk that in requiring bad faith conduct to take 
directorial misconduct beyond the reach of section 102(b)(7) 
exculpatory provisions, it will be read, or misread, to require more 
than the absence of good faith specified by the statute—i.e., bad faith 
understood as subjectively bad motivation.279   
                                                          
   275. Id. 
   276. Id. 
   277. Id. (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67).  
   278. Id. at *9. 
   279.  The court’s characterization of the “traditional” duty of loyalty in Stone and 
Disney V does not mitigate this problem, nor does its apparent association of bad faith 
as a necessary element in loyalty cases.  See id. at *6.  Duty of loyalty cases most often 
concern some form of deliberate self-dealing or other type of self-aggrandizement, 
but even traditional duty of loyalty actions do not always turn on a showing of 
subjectively improper motivation.  Courts frequently find the operative disloyalty in 
the objective, self-aggrandizing conduct of the defendant, rather than in the “bad 
faith” motivation that may have prompted it.  Indeed, the action of a director or 
officer could be entirely motivated by subjective good faith and yet objectively 
constitute self-dealing, for which the court would impose liability.   As Professor 
Eisenberg notes, “[i]t is not enough . . . that a manager acts honestly in the sense 
that he acts sincerely.  Many persons adopt belief systems that allow them to sincerely 
conclude that that morally outrageous conduct is proper.”  Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 
22; see also O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1238 (explaining the potential impact of 
group pressures on directorial decision-making). As the testimony of a number of 
the key defendants in the mega-scandals of the first years of this century shows (if we 
believe they were testifying honestly), the capacity of human beings to deceive 
themselves about their motivations where their acts objectively benefit themselves is 
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Consequently, it is important for the Delaware courts to make the 
requirements of the new good faith standard clear, especially because 
in both Disney V and Stone, the high court upheld decisions in favor 
of corporate directors.  The following discussion suggests that 
clarification of the applicable good faith/bad faith calculus could 
have a major effect on the long term impact of the standard. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLARIFYING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
PRESENCE OF SUBJECTIVE BAD FAITH AND THE ABSENCE OF GOOD 
FAITH 
A. Did Mrs. Pritchard Act in Bad Faith?—A Question of                    
Apples and Oranges 
For the purpose of restoring trust in corporate governance, the 
new good faith is full of promise.  Few would quarrel with the goal of 
instilling “true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”280  However, if the new good faith 
is to be significant, it must offer more than rhetoric and encompass 
tasks neither rendered irrelevant by section 102(b)(7) exculpatory 
provisions nor already addressed by the classic duty of loyalty. 
A good way to demonstrate the difference between the absence of 
good faith—failing to act where one has a fiduciary duty to act—and 
the traditional understanding of bad faith—acting with improper 
motivation—is to return to the Widow Pritchard and Francis v. United 
Jersey Bank.281  To understand why it is risky to define the absence of 
good faith in terms of bad faith, suppose that Francis were to arise 
today under Delaware law, and that the corporation had availed itself 
of the opportunity to include the kind of exculpatory provision 
authorized by section 102(b)(7) in its certificate of incorporation.  If 
the duty to act where one has a known duty to act were breached only 
by bad faith in the sense of subjectively improper motivation, then 
the Widow Pritchard undoubtedly would escape liability.  There was 
no evidence that she intended to harm the corporation, or that she 
preferred another’s interests to those of the entity she undertook to 
serve.  Nevertheless, her inaction is a paradigm of conscious 
disregard of directorial duties. 
Francis held Mrs. Pritchard personally liable for paying so little 
attention to corporate affairs that her feckless sons were able to 
                                                          
huge. Fiduciaries also may act disloyally for other than pecuniary reasons, see 
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 580. 
 280. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67. 
 281. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
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misappropriate virtually all of the funds the company held in trust for 
its insureds.282  Under Van Gorkom’s gross negligence standard, in the 
absence of the kind of exculpatory provision authorized by section 
102(b)(7), Mrs. Pritchard would surely be liable for breach of the 
duty of care because of her radical inattention to her directorial 
responsibilities.  The business judgment rule would not help her, 
because that rule requires at least some directorial action.283  If, on the 
other hand, the corporation had taken advantage of the right to 
exculpate directors to the extent permitted by section 102(b)(7), the 
provision arguably would immunize Mrs. Pritchard from liability for 
her clear violation of the duty of care.  The only way around the 
provision would be to invoke the statute’s exceptions.284  But, as 
described above, good faith in its traditional formulation—i.e., the 
absence of subjective bad faith motivation—would not help.  Thus, 
equating dereliction of duty with acting on the basis of subjectively 
improper motivation is like mixing apples and oranges. 
One cannot help but feel empathy for Mrs. Pritchard.  Her 
inaction merits criticism, but it is not the type of criticism that would 
be directed at her sons who, to enrich themselves personally, stole 
from the corporation and its clients.285  Nothing in the case suggests 
that her inaction was in any respect malicious or otherwise motivated 
in an ethically improper way.286  Mrs. Pritchard surely did not act in 
bad faith; her sons did.  Yet, it should be clear that Mrs. Pritchard 
breached the good faith standard articulated in Disney V.  This 
standard imposes liability “where the fiduciary intentionally fails to 
act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
                                                          
 282. Id. at 819-20, 829 (noting that Mrs. Pritchard’s husband had even warned that 
one of their sons would “take the shirt off [his] back”); see supra text accompanying 
note 118. 
 283. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (stating that, 
because it “operates only in the context of director action,” the business judgment 
rule is inapplicable “where directors have[,] . . . absent a conscious decision, failed to 
act.”); see also American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) cmt. C (American Law Institute 
Publishers, 1994). 
 284. Three of the exceptions set forth in section 102(b)(7) plainly are 
inapplicable to a claim against Mrs. Pritchard.  There is no self-dealing that would 
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty (subsection (i)), no suggestion that Mrs. 
Pritchard could be charged with the corporation’s unlawful acquisition of stock or 
payment of dividends (subsection (iii)), and no allegation that she derived improper 
benefit from a transaction (subsection (iv)). 
 285. See Francis, 432 A.2d at 818 (“Starting in 1970, . . . Charles, Jr. and William 
begin [sic] to siphon ever-increasing sums from the corporation under the guise of 
loans.”). 
 286. See id. at 819 (noting both that Mrs. Pritchard was unfamiliar with the 
rudiments of the business and that she became incapacitated after her husband’s 
death). 
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disregard for his duties.”287  Mrs. Pritchard’s subjective motivation, 
from an ethical point of view, is quite irrelevant.  Her inattention to 
her responsibilities breached her duty of good faith, not because she 
acted in bad faith, but because she failed to act in good faith.  The 
motivation-laden language of bad faith used in Disney V and Stone 
threatens to obscure this important distinction.288 
B. A Different Kind of Bad Faith 
This consideration of Francis illustrates the confusion that may arise 
if the Delaware courts fail to make the distinction between the 
absence of good faith and the presence of bad faith crystal clear.  In 
Disney V, Delaware’s high court left the door open to additional 
examples of bad faith that may lead to further development of the 
good faith duty,289 but optimal doctrinal development will occur only 
if the courts avoid the trap of conflating the absence of good faith—
i.e., conscious disregard of directorial responsibilities—with the 
presence of bad faith in the form of improper subjective motivation.  
In light of the language of Disney V, whenever a lawsuit alleges a 
conscious disregard of duty by a defendant director, the defense 
undoubtedly will argue that the challenged conduct bears none of 
the hallmarks traditionally associated with bad faith.  However, as the 
Delaware Supreme Court first pointed out in Van Gorkom and 
reiterated in Disney V, “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires 
more than the mere absence of [traditional] bad faith or fraud.”290 
Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court has defined the duty of 
good faith in the context of failure to attend to directorial duties as 
“bad faith,” expanding the meaning of “bad faith” beyond its 
traditional connotation as an ethical assessment of motivation.  The 
court did not need to take this tack.  Good faith, shorn of 
connotations of improper motivation, could have done the job by 
                                                          
   287. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).   
   288. Compare Francis, 432 A.2d 814, with Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).  
As discussed supra Part I.B.1, Joy v. North involved director quiescence in the face of 
loans potentially risking ten percent of shareholders’ equity.  Joy, 692 F.2d at 895.  
Applying Connecticut law, in an era before the passage of statutes such as section 
102(b)(7), the Second Circuit held that directors could be liable for violating the 
duty of care, saying, “[d]irectors who willingly allow others to make major decisions 
affecting the future of the corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may 
not defend on their lack of knowledge, for that ignorance itself is a breach of 
fiduciary duty.”  Id. at 896.  The outside directors were inattentive to their duties.  
They did not act in bad faith.  Under the new good faith, they could be held liable, as 
could Mrs. Pritchard, without proof that they possessed an improper motive. 
   289. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (concluding it was “unwise” to curtail development of 
fiduciary duty by offering a categorical definition). 
   290. 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
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requiring plaintiffs to plead an absence of good faith with 
appropriate specificity in conjunction with the standard procedural 
requirements for shareholder derivative actions pursuant to Delaware 
corporate law.291  It is riskier to redefine “bad faith.”  The term is so 
laden with the accumulated baggage of improper motivation that 
efforts to hold directors liable for serious inattention to duty in the 
absence of improper motive could be thwarted.  Nor was it necessary 
to define good faith in this manner to fashion a loyalty exception to 
section 102(b)(7).  Subsection (i) of the statute forbids exculpation 
of acts or omissions that violate the duty of loyalty.292   
Whatever course the courts follow, it is essential to recognize the 
substantive difference between a conscious failure to act and 
improperly motivated action.  Ultimately, “the good faith iteration’s 
utility may rest in its [capacity to serve as a] constant reminder . . . 
that, regardless of his motive, a director who consciously disregards his 
duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal 
judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.”293  Bearing 
in mind this caveat, properly applied the Disney standard offers real 
potential as a means of helping to restore trust in corporate directors 
to do their jobs. 
IV.  THE NEW GOOD FAITH AS AN ANTIDOTE FOR THE CORPORATE 
TRUST CRISIS 
The value of any legal standard depends on its effectiveness in 
promoting societal objectives.  While the ultimate impact of legal 
rules turns on the interplay of a variety of factors, including cultural 
morés, social expectations, and enforcement capability, there are 
many different routes to accomplishing societal goals through law.294  
                                                          
   291.   See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (discussing Delaware pleading requirements). 
   292.   See supra text accompanying note 154. 
   293.  Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoted in Disney V, 906 
A.2d at 67 n.111) (emphasis added). 
   294.   As Lisa Fairfax points out, “some scholars argue that legal sanctions may be 
neither necessary (because of extra-legal factors [e.g., management pressures and 
fear of reputational damage] that shape director conduct) nor effective in 
constraining director behavior.”  Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 427.  Others, 
particularly contractarians, oppose legal strictures on directorial conduct because of 
the transaction costs these kinds of laws generate.  As Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout 
observe, however, neither the market nor the law alone does a particularly effective 
job of keeping directors faithful to their fiduciary responsibilities.  See Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737-38 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Blair and Stout].  Both 
Professor Fairfax and Professors Blair and Stout offer analyses of the operation of 
legal and extra-legal forces.  Professor Fairfax emphasizes her disagreement with 
those who eschew directorial liability and focuses on the need for sanctions to hold 
directors accountable for adherence to fiduciary duties.  See Spare the Rod, supra note 
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In Sarbanes-Oxley,295 Congress chose to address the need to restore 
trust in the corporate sector by enacting prescriptive measures that 
focus principally on constraining the behavior of critical actors.  
Delaware’s new good faith embodies a complementary but quite 
different approach.  To the extent the courts prove willing to enforce 
it, the Disney standard promises to promote general trustworthiness 
instead of requiring actors to act, or refrain from acting, in specified 
ways.  After a brief look at trust in the corporate fiduciary context, the 
following discussion focuses on the potential effectiveness of the new 
good faith as a vehicle to promote trust in corporate directors by 
encouraging trustworthy conduct. 
A.  The Nature of Trust in the Context of Corporate Fiduciary Relationships 
Trust is a critical aspect of life.  The very act of living requires a 
basic level of faith in our ability to perceive the physical world and to 
understand both intellectual concepts and the complex interactions 
that comprise our social environment.296  Trust is integral to social 
well-being,297 and it is “at the root of any economic system based on 
mutually beneficial exchange.”298  Without some level of trust in 
                                                          
20, at 395.  Professors Blair and Stout focus on the operation of trust within the firm.  
See Blair & Stout, supra. 
 295. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (Supp. 2003). 
 296. Consequently, as Mark Hall points out, “[w]hether trust is regarded as an end 
in itself, or as a means to some other end, trust is too important and pervasive for the 
law to neglect in any realm.”  Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
463, 525 (2002).  Professor Hall draws on the metaphor of trust as a  kind of social 
adhesive.  See id. at 464.  In a similar vein, in the corporate arena, Lawrence Mitchell 
describes trust as “the glue that binds corporate relationships,” suggesting that: 
No matter how strong the legal rules requiring fiduciary loyalty are, no matter how 
successfully the market aligns a fiduciary’s self-interest with corporate interest, trust is 
essential for corporate survival.  In the absence of some measure of trust between 
those who invest their money and those who manage it, the corporation cannot 
succeed as an efficient business entity. 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 425 
(1993) [hereinafter Fairness and Trust]; see also, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic 
Rationality and the Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993); Russell 
Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS 26, 41-42 (1996); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591 (2001) [hereinafter Importance of Being 
Trusted]. 
 297. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST:  THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY 7-8 (1995), referenced by Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, and Lessons from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2002) 
[hereinafter Lessons]; see also, e.g., Perspective, supra note 20, at 16 (“The corporate 
governance system depends on trust in people—especially the directors, regulators 
and courts.”).  From a marketing perspective, trust sells products.  Consequently, for 
decades companies have spent a great deal of money to advertise slogans such as 
“you can trust your car to the man who wears the star,” or that theirs is “a name you 
can trust.” 
 298. Alan Greenspan’s commencement address given at Harvard University in 
June of 1999 (quoted in FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting COLLEGE 
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corporations and those who manage their affairs, hiding money 
under the mattress would be more attractive than investing in stocks 
and bonds.  While legal scholars and social scientists debate the 
extent to which legal sanctions, market signals, and other factors 
generate trust,299 both proponents of an economic understanding of 
law and those who challenge the validity of the homo economicus model 
agree that trust is valuable—as a means of increasing efficiency by 
reducing transaction costs300 and/or as a social good in and of itself.301 
 As Professors Blair and Stout observe, “[t]he essence of a fiduciary 
relationship is the legal expectation that the fiduciary will adopt the 
other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark of 
trustworthy behavior.”302  Corporate directors have a direct fiduciary 
relationship with the entities they serve and an indirect fiduciary 
relationship with the shareholders.  Shareholders entrust control of 
their property to directors who are charged with overall management 
of the corporation.303  They expect those who manage the companies 
                                                          
ADMINISTRATION PUBLICATIONS, ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS:  A MESSAGE FROM ALAN 
GREENSPAN, CAP ELECTRONIC BULL. (Oct. 19, 1999), available at http://www. 
collegepubs.com/elecbulletin.shtml#EB99.4)); see also FRANKEl, supra note 10, at 49. 
(“Trust has a crucial role in promoting prosperity.”). 
 299. For a discussion of the role of legal and market sanctions, social and 
economic context, and internalized learning in promoting trust within the firm, see 
Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1747-53. 
 300. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LUHMAN, TRUST AND POWER 79, 93-94 (1979); Jay B. Barney 
& Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 175 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, 
Meinhard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137, 146 
(1999) (“Broad fiduciary obligations facilitate the financing of ventures, mitigate the 
effects of managers’ risk-aversion, align the financing decisions of investors with the 
true economic desirability of projects, and align the incentives of managers with the 
benefit to the economy and the desire of investors”); Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 553, 555 (2001) (Trust “refers to the willingness to make oneself 
vulnerable to another without costly external constraints.  Trust is socially valuable, 
and thus society should encourage it.”). 
 301. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 206 (“The one thing on which we need 
not compromise is the ambition to become an honest society and to have our society 
reap the rich rewards of honesty.”). 
 302. Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1743. 
   303. Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 430, citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684-87 (1990) 
(“[T]he power holder has complete freedom to conduct that segment of the 
dependent’s life over which she has been given responsibility.”) (citation omitted); 
see also, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 300, at 556 (“Trust can be seen simply as a decision 
by one person to give power over his person or property to another in exchange for a 
return promise.”).  Mitchell notes that in the corporate context, “[t]he power and 
control that are present in all fiduciary relationships are exaggerated . . . because the 
indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practically infinite array of 
investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility of specified 
limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders unrealistic.”  
Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 430. 
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they invest in to produce value, and they anticipate a share in the 
benefit derived from their capital.  Shareholders are entitled to 
directors who act in a trustworthy fashion. 
Today, more Americans own stock than at any other time in 
history.  The number of shareholders has grown exponentially over 
the last several decades, increasing from one percent of the 
population in 1900 to thirteen percent in 1980, to more than fifty 
percent by the turn of the twenty-first century.304  Large corporations 
employ tens of millions of workers,305 and a number of major 
corporations wield more global economic power than many of the 
world’s countries.306  Americans therefore have a compelling interest 
in the trustworthiness of those who manage major corporations.  One 
of the most important purposes of corporate fiduciary law is to 
encourage directors to merit this trust, for the benefit of the public 
generally and shareholders in particular. 
While trust is critical in the corporate fiduciary context, as 
Professor Mitchell has observed, this recognition “does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the result of that trust will in 
some sense be the ‘true’ or ‘right’ result or the result that one would 
have chosen for herself.  In other words, one can be mistaken yet 
trustworthy.”307  The notion that it is better to allow directors to make 
mistakes than to curtail entrepreneurial freedom is the operative 
principle of the business judgment rule, and it is consistent with the 
emergence of the new good faith.308  The Disney standard does not 
require directors to act correctly; in keeping with the exclusion set 
                                                          
 304. See CAPLOW ET AL., supra note 9.  As David Skeel observes, “for the first time in 
history, the stock market is the investment of choice of many Americans’ ordinary, 
‘safe’ savings, not just their savings at risk.”  DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:  
THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 212 
(2005). 
 305. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 382. 
 306. For example, in a 2002 comparison of countries’ national gross domestic 
products with the sales of major corporations Wal-Mart placed nineteenth—between 
Belgium and Sweden, General Motors followed Poland in twenty-forth place, and 
Exxon Mobil was in twenty-sixth place—between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.  Sales 
figures for many other large corporations exceeded the GDP of most of the world’s 
countries.  SARAH ANDERSON, THEA LEE AND JOHN CAVANAUGH, FIELD GUIDE TO THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005).  More recent data is available by comparing statistics 
compiled by Forbes and by the World Bank.  See Special Report:  The Forbes Global 
2000, available at http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/30/05f2000land.html; World 
Bank Development Report 2007:  Development and the Next Generation at 294 
(table 4. Economic Activity), available at http://www-wds.worldbank. org. 
 307. Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 433.  This is parallel to the philosophical 
insight that a decision may be rational but ultimately wrong. 
 308. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1436 (“[T]hese evolving 
expectations may be largely aspirational standards of conduct.”); see also, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 62; Harvey L. Pitt, The Changing Standards by which Directors 
Will Be Judged, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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forth in section 102(b)(7)(ii), the new good faith standard prohibits 
conscious disregard of directorial responsibilities, particularly a 
failure to act in the face of a known duty to act.309  It does not limit 
the protection the business judgment rule affords to directors and 
the decisions they make.  Nor does it put directors at risk for acting 
negligently, or even grossly negligently, so long as they actually fulfill 
their duty to act when they are required to do so.  The thrust of the 
Disney standard is much more modest, but it is nevertheless 
important.  A brief review of what many have called the corporate 
governance crisis—particularly the aspects we refer to as the corporate 
trust crisis—helps explain why. 
B. The Corporate Trust Crisis 
The 1990s began with a mild recession. During the remainder of 
the decade, however, the Dow Jones average and NASDAQ index 
climbed to previously unprecedented levels.310  This was a period 
when many people leapt at the chance to become members of the 
boards of major corporations.  Corporate directorships offered 
significant compensation along with enviable prestige and attractive 
perquisites.311  During the same time, however, the number of federal 
criminal prosecutions and associated civil proceedings against 
corporations and corporate managers steadily increased.312  
Unfortunately, with a few notable exceptions such as the high-profile 
prosecutions of Caremark and Columbia/HCA and the associated 
shareholders’ derivative actions,313 these developments received 
relatively little attention.  They did not deter investors from 
continuing to put their money into corporate securities. Nor did they 
                                                          
 309. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67  (Del. June 8, 2006). 
 310. The Dow Jones average peaked in January 2000, and the Nasdaq reached its 
record closing high in March 2003.  Jonathan Fuerbringer, The Markets:  Market Place; 
Stocks Surge, Bonds Fall, and Some See a New Bull Run, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at C1.  
“The decade of the 90s . . . represented the halcyon days of the boom.”  E. Norman 
Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 
2135, 2135 (2003). 
 311. See Abigail Aims, 2005 Trends in the Corporate Governance Practices of the 100 
Largest U.S. Public Companies, 1523 PLI/Corp 233, 240 (2006) (noting that the 
majority of the largest 100 U.S. companies pay directors retainers of $40,000 or more 
in cash, along with meeting fees, travel reimbursement, benefits such as life and 
health insurance, and free products and services); see also, e.g., Inside the Boardroom—
Board Profiles:  A Seattle Times Special Report, THE SEATTLE TIMES, at E1, Oct. 5, 2003 
(reporting on retainers and other perquisites provided to leading companies in the 
state of Washington, such as $95,000 per year in annual fees for Weyerhauser board 
members and $45,000 for Nordstrom directors). 
   312. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations:  Legal Ethics, 
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 875-77 (2003) 
[hereinafter Internal Investigations]. 
   313. See supra Part II.A.2.a. & b. 
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discourage service on corporate boards to any great extent; some 
noted individuals served on five or more corporate boards during the 
same time period.314 
The raucous activity of the bull market drowned out voices calling 
for reform.315  The question whether corporate boards could be 
trusted to oversee the operations and finances of large companies 
began to garner significant national attention only after Caremark 
and other leading health care providers were caught in the sweeping 
federal anti-health-fraud campaigns initiated during the Clinton 
Administration.316  In combination with the advent of the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines a few years earlier317 and a 
concomitant increase in federal prosecutorial activity in the business 
sector,318 the Caremark decision engendered a rapidly expanding 
industry in corporate compliance programs.319  These measures 
offered hope for resolution of the kinds of monitoring problems at 
issue in Caremark.  As Enron’s celebrated code of ethics illustrates, 
however, compliance measures are of little use without diligent 
oversight.320 
                                                          
 314. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, When Directors Play Musical Chairs; Seats on Too 
Many Boards Spell Problems for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at § 3 page 1 
(reporting that in 1995 “68 directors of Fortune 100 companies sat on nine or more 
corporate boards, up from 36 . . . in 1991”); Judith H. Dobrzynski, Market Place; Report 
Calls for Recasting Corporate Boards, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 12, 1996, at D1 (reporting that 
among 7,200 Fortune 1,000 company directors, 207 held seats on seven or more 
boards and many more sat on four or five); Patricia Sabatini, WE [Westinghouse] Board 
Represented Well on List of Laggards, PITTS. POST GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 1995, at B9 (noting 
that one Westinghouse director served on eleven boards and discussing multiple 
board memberships as a possible source of some of the problems faced by troubled 
companies); Aims, supra note 311, at 239-40 (reporting on multiple board 
memberships among directors of 100 largest U.S. companies).  See also note 388 infra. 
 315. Despite the bull market of the 1990s institutional investors such as CALPERS 
were calling for corporate governance reforms.  See N.Y. TIMES articles, supra note 
314.  In fact, a number of significant reform movements began in the 1990s.  See E. 
Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. L. 1447 
(2004). 
 316. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege on the Business of American Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301 
(2006) [hereinafter Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege]. 
 317. See Internal Investigations, supra note 312, at 875-77. 
 318. See id. at 876-77. 
 319. See id. at 881-84. 
  320.  Enron had a comprehensive, beautifully drafted corporate ethics code that 
provided: “[w]e are dedicated to conducting business according to all applicable 
local and international laws and regulations . . . and with the highest professional 
and ethical standards.”  ENRON CORP., ENRON CODE OF ETHICS 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/packageart/enron/enron.pdf. All Enron 
employees were required to sign a certificate of compliance confirming that they had 
read the corporate ethics code and agreed to comply with it.  Id. at 3.  In addition to 
providing information on legal compliance, Enron’s Code of Ethics contained 
inspiring language on honesty and integrity.  Id.  It even stated:  “Ruthlessness, 
callousness and arrogance don’t belong here.”  Id. at 4. 
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Corporate governance reform became a national priority following 
the financial disasters that ravaged Enron, WorldCom, and other 
corporate giants beginning in the fall of 2001.  Many Americans lost 
jobs, pensions, health care and other benefits in these debacles.321  
These events badly damaged confidence in the integrity of corporate 
executives and undermined faith in the ability of directors to keep 
officers honest and companies financially sound.322  The Disney 
litigation involved very different issues, but it similarly undermined 
faith in directors as effective corporate overseers.  At least in the short 
run, Michael Ovitz made more money by failing to work out as 
president than if he had actually done a good job for the company.  
As both Chancellor Chandler and the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized, the conduct of Disney’s directors was scarcely a model of 
best practices;323 it certainly did not engender trust. 
The Disney plaintiffs claimed that Chairman Michael Eisner had 
engaged in misconduct.324  A number of senior executives of Enron 
and other companies involved in spectacular financial debacles were 
charged with fraud and other crimes.325  Outside directors, however, 
were rarely accused of dishonesty or bad faith.  Their principal 
shortcomings arose from an inability to discern what was happening 
to the companies entrusted to their care. The shenanigans of senior 
executives in combination with the oversight failures of directors 
generated a crisis in corporate trust. 
The corporate trust crisis has provoked many different reactions.  
The most notable legislative response was, of course, Sarbanes-
Oxley,326 the most significant expansion of the scope of federal 
securities law since the 1930s.  In many respects, Sarbanes-Oxley 
entered a realm of law previously reserved to the states.327  In contrast 
                                                          
 321. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 322. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. As Faith Stevelman Kahn has 
observed, “[l]ike that of the Twin Towers, Enron’s collapse was sudden, devastating, 
and horribly unjust in its effect.”  Kahn, supra note 163, at 1584. 
 323. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 58-59 (Del. June 8, 2006); Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 697 
(Del. Ch. 2005).  
 324. See supra Part II. 
 325. See, e.g., Year of Scandals, Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6. 
 326. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 -7266 (Supp. 2003). 
 327. See James H. Cheek, III, The Legislative and Judicial Response to Recent Corporate 
Governance Failures—Will It Be Effective—Part II?, 5 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 311, 
312 (2004); Harvey L. Pitt, The Changing Standards by Which Directors Will Be Judged, 79 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).  Many authorities describe the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation as the “federalization” of corporate law, suggesting that unless Delaware 
and other states act decisively, Congress will continue to expand federal control over 
corporate governance and other aspects of business regulation traditionally reserved 
to the states.  See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance 
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443 (2003) 
[hereinafter State-Federal Tension].  For discussion of the nature and impact of 
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to Delaware’s enabling approach,328 Sarbanes-Oxley sets forth a 
number of specific, self-executing mandates, such as verification of 
financial statements by CEOs and CFOs and prohibitions on loans to 
senior officers and directors,329 and it directs the SEC and other 
federal agencies to promulgate additional rules and regulations.330  
Congress enacted the statute in an effort to restore confidence in 
securities markets.331  It seeks to constrain the behavior of corporate 
actors by establishing positive requirements and negative 
prohibitions.  These kinds of constraints work well with respect to the 
specific areas they address.  However, they also may encourage actors 
to find ways around them.  Tax “loopholes” provide the classic 
example.  At best, this approach places reliable limits only on the 
                                                          
“federalization,” see Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 396-408.  Some commentators 
contend that Congress has gone too far into a realm traditionally reserved to the 
states.  Jill Fisch, for example, argues that “[t]he increasing intrusion of federal law 
into how corporations go about their business threatens to sacrifice the prime 
objective of corporate productivity.”  Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of 
Corporate Governance, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 49 (2004); see also, Florence Shu-
Acquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited:  Lessons Learned in Light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 19, 49 (2004).  At least one commentator 
attributes the need for Congressional action to the inaction of state officials, 
specifically blaming state legislators for the fiduciary lapses that contributed to the 
collapse of Enron and other problems.  See Brown, supra note 160, at 317-18 (“The 
scandals arose in large part out of a failure of managerial oversight. . . .  Not so much 
a matter of director indolence, the lack of oversight occurred in large part because 
state laws did not impose meaningful obligations on the board of directors in 
supervising the activities of the company.”).  Former Delaware Chief Justice Norman 
Veasey, however, characterizes Sarbanes-Oxley as an ill-conceived measure “cobbled 
together by Congress . . . [with] little regard for collateral damage—both in terms of 
principles of federalism and in terms of shrinking the universe of qualified and 
willing directors.” E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 
59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2003-2004). For a general discussion of issues pertaining to 
federalism and Sarbanes-Oxley, see E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of 
Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, 
Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2003).  But see Andrew A. Lundgren, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Then Disney:  The Post-Scandal Corporate Governance Plot Thickens, 8 DEL. 
L. REV. 195 (2006) (suggesting that the risk of federalization is likely to diminish as 
the crises that prompted enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley recede in time). 
 328. See supra note 154. 
 329. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241; 15 U.S.C. § 78m.  See generally Lyman P. Q. Johnson 
& Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1149, 1209 (2004) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as a collection of “piecemeal 
[mandates] on a wide variety of subjects, sometimes aiming at the board of director 
level and sometimes centering on senior officers”). 
 330. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7233 (directing the SEC to issue regulations pertaining to 
audit procedures and auditor independence); 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (instructing SEC to 
issue rules pertaining to professional responsibility of attorneys practicing before the 
Commission). 
   331.   See, e.g., Adriain M. Morse, Jr., Breaking the Circle:  The Problem of Independent 
Directors Policing Public Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC’s New Rules Governing 
Public Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, 675 (2004) 
(quoting remarks by SEC Chairman William Donaldson and former SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt on the need to reassure investors and restore trust in the wake of 
corporate scandals). 
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target conduct that is spelled out in the applicable statutory 
provisions and concomitant regulations.  It does not promote trust.332 
Delaware’s recognition of good faith as a significant fiduciary 
obligation reflects a complementary, but very different, response to 
the corporate trust crisis.333  Its promise lies not in its constraints in 
targeting specific misconduct, but in its capacity to encourage 
directors to take their responsibility to do their jobs as least as 
seriously as they take their perquisites.  Before exploring the 
potential of this new fiduciary standard, however, it is useful to look 
briefly at the ways in which the longstanding duties of loyalty and care 
function and where they fall short as a means of promoting 
trustworthy action on the part of outside directors. 
C. Trust and the Fiduciary Duties Owed by Corporate Directors 
The duties of loyalty and care developed in response to well-
founded doubts about the trustworthiness of corporate managers.  As 
discussed in Part I, for more than a century legislators and courts 
have struggled with the tension between entrepreneurial freedom 
and managerial accountability.334  The classic duties of loyalty and 
care impose obligations designed to ensure that corporate fiduciaries 
merit trust.335  While both duties make strong exhortative demands on 
directors, as a result of the operation of the business judgment rule, 
enforcement of the duty of care historically has been weak, and the 
                                                          
 332. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 300, at 555-56 (“[M]andatory rules to increase 
trust, in any form, may have precisely the opposite effect. . . . In particular, regulation 
gives parties a weapon that they might use opportunistically, thereby increasing the 
risk of distrust.”).  A clear example of this effect is found in qui tam actions.  
Whatever its positive effects, the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000), 
undermines trust within organizations by giving constituents an incentive to turn in 
employees and colleagues for pecuniary gain.  See generally Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, supra note 316. 
 333. As Andrew Lundgren points out in a recent article, “SOX and Disney are 
both products of the post-Enron world and reactions to perceived corporate 
governance failures, but they differ significantly at their core.”  See Lundgren, supra 
note 327, at 195. 
 334. See supra Part I.B.  Courts also often find it difficult to define a fiduciary 
relationship.  See Lessons, supra note 297; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1780-
89 (discussing the nature of trust in fiduciary relationships); Deborah A. DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (noting 
that “[f]iduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American 
law”). 
 335. See Lessons, supra note 297, at 1026 (“[B]y imposing special duties on 
participants in special trust relationships, the law of fiduciary obligations ‘permit[s] 
and encourage[s] the reposing of trust.’” (quoting Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and 
Money:  An Affinity-Based Model for the Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses, 
2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 259, 280 (1988))). 
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duty of loyalty most often comes into play only when adverse financial 
interests arise.336 
1. Trust and the duty of loyalty 
Although the precise parameters vary, all states impose on 
corporate directors an obligation to put the interests of the entities 
they serve before their personal objectives in matters pertaining to 
their directorial duties.  When issues relating to breach of the duty of 
loyalty arise, they almost always do so in the context of conflicting 
pecuniary interests.  Consequently, the jurisprudence of loyalty 
focuses principally on prohibitions against self-dealing.337  While some 
question the magnitude of the transaction costs it imposes,338 by 
encouraging fidelity on the part of corporate directors, the duty of 
loyalty fosters trust on the part of shareholders and other corporate 
constituents.339  The problem with relying too much on the classic 
duty of loyalty is, as earlier discussed, that it generally involves 
conflicting financial interests.  Instances in which the disputed 
conduct involves dereliction of duty rather than subjectively bad 
motives for culpable acts or omissions does not fit so readily within 
the duty.340  
2. Trust and the duty of care 
As noted in Part I, the desire to preserve entrepreneurial freedom 
has sometimes proved an obstacle to ensuring greater managerial 
accountability.  This conflict has been particularly apparent in efforts 
to define the scope of the duty of care, principally because the 
                                                          
 336. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (discussing traditional reach of duty of loyalty); see 
also supra Part I.B. 
   337. See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.  Statutory safe harbor provisions 
applicable to conflicting interest transactions seek to permit interested-director 
transactions that may benefit corporations by providing for transparency and 
independent review—i.e., disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest and 
approval by directors who are neither interested in a proposed opportunity or 
transaction nor dependent upon a director involved in it.  In Delaware and other 
states, directors may be excused from liability for conflicting interest transactions, as 
well as other forms of self-dealing in certain situations, but only when it is clear that 
the corporation has suffered no harm as a result of the fiduciary breach and that the 
challenged transaction was entirely fair to the corporation.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).  Lawrence Mitchell, however, argues 
persuasively that “the fairness test in corporate law enhances fiduciaries’ power to 
self-deal with the practical ability and legal right to do so.  The fairness test is neither 
fair nor much of a test.”  Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 491. 
   338. See Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 
J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (asserting that the duty of loyalty comes at the high 
price of specification and monitoring). 
   339. See id. at 425. 
   340.   See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (“[C]onduct of this kind does not involve 
disloyalty (as traditionally defined).”).  See generally supra Parts II.B and III. 
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business judgment rule limits the scope of the duty as an enforceable 
standard of liability.  In so doing, the business judgment rule provides 
corporate directors with unique protection against personal liability 
for negligence, and, since the enactment of section 102(b)(7), even 
gross negligence.  Comparison of the application of the business 
judgment rule in corporate legal disputes with the operation of the 
standard of care in medical malpractice litigation provides a practical 
example.341 
Medical malpractice actions most often sound in negligence.  To 
prevail, a plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of care and 
prove that the defendant health care provider violated that 
standard.342  The standard of care is usually quite specific.  It serves as 
a measure of what a prudent provider would do in the same or 
similar circumstances.343  Consequently, it involves both procedural 
and substantive criteria.  Suppose, for example, that a patient 
consults a physician for treatment of a skin lesion.  The applicable 
standard of care would require the physician to follow certain 
procedures—e.g., examine the lesion carefully and possibly biopsy it, 
question the patient about its onset and any concurrent symptoms, 
review the patient’s medical history and the environments in which 
he lives and works, etc.  If the physician follows proper procedures, 
she can take some comfort that she is not only treating her patient 
properly but that she is protecting herself against liability for medical 
malpractice.  Proper procedures alone are not enough, however.  
The physician must also draw reasonable conclusions and take 
appropriate actions in response to her findings.344  If the physician 
does not do so, she may be held liable for malpractice—e.g., if, 
despite following proper procedures, she fails to diagnose and treat 
malignant melanoma.345  The principal limitation on judicial review of 
                                                          
   341. See also, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that while 
an automobile driver would likely be held liable for a mistake in judgment that 
resulted in harm to a pedestrian, a corporate officer would rarely be found liable for 
a judgment error that caused injury to a corporation). 
   342. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 264-78 (2d ed., West Group 2000).  Medical 
malpractice actions, like corporate fiduciary challenges, traditionally are governed 
primarily by state law.  See Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 316. 
   343. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 342, at 264-66. 
   344. See id. at 264 (quoting the two-pronged standard of care set forth by Hall v. 
Hillburn, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985)). 
   345. Lawyers are in a similar position.  In Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806 
(Mass. 1996), a law firm was held liable when it gave estate planning clients advice 
that, although reasonable at the time, “proved to be wrong.”  Liability was based on 
the fact that the firm rendered its opinion with an “apparent certainty . . . at a time 
when the issue was not conclusively resolved, den[ying] the plaintiffs the opportunity 
to assess the risk and to elect to follow alternative estate planning options.”  Id.  See 
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the physician’s actions is the general requirement of expert testimony 
to establish the applicable standard of care.  Once evidence is offered 
to establish the appropriate standard, the trier of fact determines 
whether the physician has committed negligence and is therefore 
subject to personal liability. 
In contrast, the business judgment rule operates solely at the 
procedural level.346  The recognition that business people often must 
make decisions on the basis of imperfect information underlies the 
rule.347  Health care providers, too, must act without optimal 
information.  However, the standard of care applicable in medical 
malpractice actions, unlike the business judgment rule, does not 
protect them from substantive judicial review of their actions.  As 
Professor Mitchell notes, “the business judgment rule suggests that as 
long as decisions are made in [good faith, with due care, and with 
regard to the best interests of the corporation], those decisions are 
justified in the context of the fiduciary relationship.  Put simply, they 
are deserving of trust.”348  No matter how ill-advised their actions, 
directors are not legally accountable for the substance of their 
decisions unless their judgment is compromised by conflicting 
pecuniary interests or, at least in theory, a failure to follow 
appropriate procedures in the decision-making process.  Thus, 
directors need not reach the “true” or “right” result to avoid liability 
or to merit trust; they can be “mistaken yet trustworthy.”349 
As the historical discussion in Part I notes, courts originally 
adopted the business judgment rule because it fit well with the 
objectives of investors and their willingness to accept risk as a quid 
pro quo for the promise of significant returns on their investments.350  
Section 102(b)(7), however, created a shield that went far beyond the 
protection afforded by the business judgment rule.  In permitting 
corporations to exempt directors from personal liability for all 
instances of negligence and gross negligence, section 102(b)(7) 
appeared to excuse even the kinds of malfeasance at issue in Francis 
and Joy.351  While it may not have altered social norms overnight, this 
                                                          
generally R. E. MALLEN & J. M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, Chs. 18-19 (5th ed., West 
Group 2000). 
   346. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107; see also Bainbridge, supra note 93 
(suggesting that the business judgment rule operates as an abstention doctrine 
rather than  as a standard of review). 
   347. See Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 434. 
   348. Id. at 435. 
   349. Id. at 433. 
   350. See supra Part I.B. 
   351. See id. 
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change in the law certainly freed directors from concerns over legal 
liability for negligent performance of their responsibilities. 
There are undoubtedly a variety of reasons why directors who 
should know better sometimes consciously disregard their fiduciary 
obligations even when the duty to act is clear.  First, as Congress 
recognized in requiring members of the audit committees of publicly 
held corporations to possess certain basic qualifications, a lack of 
financial independence may cloud directors’ judgment.352  Similarly, a 
lack of suitable expertise may discourage outside directors from 
paying adequate attention to corporate finances.  As Chancellor 
Chandler noted in Disney IV, problems often arise in companies 
presided over by “an imperial CEO or controlling shareholder with a 
supine or passive board.”353  Overcommitment on the part of directors 
who sit on multiple boards raises other kinds of issues.354  An 
aggressive “whatever it takes” management culture may intimidate 
outside directors from inquiring about questionable management 
practices even when they know they should do so,355 or the failure of 
lawyers and other “gatekeepers” properly to advise directors as to 
their responsibilities may lull directors into inaction.356  Finally, 
perhaps some directors, like the Widow Pritchard,357 just don’t care. 
The growing realization that the boards of a number of major 
corporations were unable to prevent serious misconduct on the part 
of officers and employees led to the focus on the good faith 
exception to section 102(b)(7) that first generated significant 
attention following the Caremark decision.358  Although the Delaware 
courts continue to refine its parameters, the fiduciary duty to act in 
good faith could become a significant tool in efforts to restore trust 
in corporate directors to do their jobs.  If the courts, however, 
evidence reluctance to hold directors accountable for significant 
                                                          
   352. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3). 
(Supp. 2003). 
   353. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
   354. See supra note 314. 
   355. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1251-55 (suggesting that an aggressive 
corporate culture can create pressure on individuals to engage in unethical 
behavior). 
   356. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:  It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 
57 BUS. L. 1403 (2002). 
   357. See supra text accompanying notes 116-127. 
   358. See supra Part II.A.2.a.  For discussion of the Enron and WorldCom situations, 
see WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 148-77 (Feb. 
1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport; DICK 
THORNBURGH, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT 
EXAMINER 6-7 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http:// fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf. 
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derelictions of known duties, then the new good faith will become 
little more than a rhetorical exhortation replete with good form but 
utterly lacking in substance.359  As Chancellor Chandler observed in 
Disney II, “the law must be strong enough to intervene against the 
abuse of trust.”360 
D. The New Good Faith as a Means of Promoting Trust 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Francis, “[t]he 
sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is 
charged to protect.”361  Unless directors are willing to act 
conscientiously in overseeing the affairs of the corporations they 
manage, no matter how talented or accomplished they may be,362 they 
are not worthy of trust, and they should not be entitled to participate 
in managing the business entities so vital to the economic well-being 
of their constituents.  Whether the new good faith will contribute 
meaningfully to the task of restoring corporate trust depends to a 
large extent on whether it motivates outside directors to engage 
actively in their oversight function, and, just as importantly, whether 
it offers a means of holding them accountable if they fail to do so.  
Unless subsequent judicial decisions so dull its edge that, like the 
proverbial knife incapable of cutting butter, it becomes functionally 
useless, we believe that the Disney standard is capable of achieving 
these objectives for four key reasons. 
1. The new good faith as an enforceable legal standard 
Unless the defense bar succeeds in turning the Disney standard into 
an examination of directors’ subjective motivations, the standard 
offers the hope of closing at least part of the accountability gap 
created by section 102(b)(7) by holding out the threat of personal 
liability for conscious disregard of known duties.  As discussed in Part 
I.B, the business judgment rule cut deep inroads into the duty of care 
as a standard of liability, and the exculpatory provisions authorized by 
section 102(b)(7) gutted the duty, relegating it to the status of an 
aspirational objective for directors of corporations with such 
provisions in their certificates of incorporation.363  The advent of the 
new duty of good faith, even as a distinct component of the duty of 
                                                          
   359.    See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1. 
   360.   Disney II, 825 A.2d at 291. 
   361.  Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (citation 
omitted). 
   362.    See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
   363. See supra Part I.C and Part II.A. 
DUGGINGOLDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER 1/9/2007  1:11:44 PM 
2006] RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE DIRECTORS 269 
loyalty, does not alter the protections afforded to directors and their 
decisions by the business judgment rule, nor does it undercut the 
liability shield available to directors pursuant to section 102(b)(7), 
for negligent, or even grossly negligent, decisions.  It does, however, 
provide a means of holding those who accept the prestige and 
perquisites of corporate directorships accountable to act when their 
duty to do so is clear.  While shareholders theoretically have the 
power to vote directors out of office, this authority is too seldom 
exercised with respect to the boards of major corporations.  By 
providing a cause of action against directors who evidence a “we 
don’t care about the risks attitude,”364 however, the new good faith 
requires directors to exercise their power.365  At least where directors 
have a known duty to act, the Disney standard promises to place much 
needed limitations on the legal license not to care created by section 
102(b)(7).366  Thus, the new good faith is a modest step, but it is an 
important one.367 
                                                          
 364. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); see Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63. 
 365. See Sale, supra note 18, at 495 (“Strong enforcement of the duty of good faith 
creates an incentive to prompt fiduciaries to better behavior, even if we cannot 
change their character.”).   
 366. For various perspectives on the effectiveness of legal sanctions as a means of 
promoting fiduciary fidelity,  see, e.g., Blair and Stout, supra note 294, at 1750-53 
(offering an anti-contractarian view of the advantages of “internalized trust” over 
prescriptive legal rules as a means of generating trust and trustworthy behavior 
within the firm); Ribstein, supra note 300, at 590 (“[M]andatory regulation may 
actually decrease . . . trust by creating opportunities for distrust and inhibiting trust-
creation.”). Discussion of contractarian and anti-contractarian views on the 
desirability of legal sanctions in corporate fiduciary law is fascinating but beyond the 
scope of this Article.  However, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley testifies to a 
widespread desire for legal sanctions capable of reining in business executives—both 
officers and directors.  Similarly, a number of scholars have called for more 
comprehensive legal regulation of directorial conduct.  Professor Fairfax, for 
example, advocates this position in a recent article:  “[A]lthough legal liability has 
some costs, and hence its rod should not be used without an appreciation of those 
costs and an attempt to minimize them, sparing directors that rod altogether may 
encourage them to engage in lax behavior to the detriment of shareholders and the 
public alike.”  Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 456.  Cf., FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 119 
(during the past three decades “[w]e have emasculated the regulation of trusted 
persons—fiduciaries . . . [and] changed legal doctrine to reduce the burdens and 
stigma on embezzling fiduciaries and converted them to salespersons and 
contracting parties in the markets.”). 
 367. The new good faith may also serve an important role from a federalism 
perspective. As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey notes, “[T]he Delaware 
franchise is fragile largely because of encroaching federalization.”  Corporate Universe, 
supra note 2, at 163.  In enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress entered into the realm of 
corporate governance law previously reserved to the states.  See State-Federal Tension, 
supra note 327. Chief Justice Veasey and others have argued that this intrusion 
amounts to an unwise “federalization” of corporate fiduciary law.  See id.  See generally 
sources cited supra note 327; cf. Johnson & Sides, supra note 329, at 1225 (suggesting 
that while some provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley preempt state fiduciary law, these are 
targeted sections that will neither preempt state fiduciary law generally nor preclude 
state law from providing a “conceptual framework”). While it is certainly possible for 
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2. The Disney standard as a means of incorporating  emerging business 
and social morés into corporate fiduciary law 
Delaware’s former Chief Justice has observed that incorporating good 
faith into fiduciary law permits the law to embrace “evolving 
expectations”—the morés of the business community itself, as well as 
broader societal demands.368  As Professor Eisenberg has explained: 
Circumstances change, the social norms applicable to the conduct 
of business change, business practices change, concepts of 
efficiency and other issues of policy applicable to corporate law 
change. . . . In some cases, the articulation of such an obligation 
can be justified by the duties of care or loyalty.  In other cases, it 
cannot.  In those cases, the duty of good faith often provides a 
principle that supports the articulation of the new obligation.369 
If the courts resist the temptation to eviscerate the flexibility 
inherent in the new good faith standard, the doctrine promises to 
fulfill a critical function in a changing legal environment, particularly 
in the corporate area.370  As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey 
points out, the relevant standards are those that develop within the 
business sector itself and within the broader community in which it 
operates.371  The new good faith provides an important incentive for 
directors to keep up with business and societal expectations and 
reminds them that they cannot ignore their responsibility to act in 
accordance with these standards without facing legal consequences. 
While courts should be concerned about fairness in embracing any 
liability standard that has flexible parameters, the very development 
of the common law itself rests on the adaptability of judge-made 
law.372  This is particularly true in Delaware corporate law where both 
the legislature and the courts have embraced an “enabling 
approach.”373  Moreover, if Delaware and other states do not hold 
directors accountable for flouting their duties while greedily 
embracing the privileges and perquisites of office, the increasingly 
fragile franchise that states hold over corporate governance matters 
                                                          
federal and state law to operate in a complementary fashion in this important area, if 
the states are to maintain preeminence in general corporate law, lawmakers and 
courts need to take measures to hold corporate decision-makers more accountable.  
The new good faith is a step in this direction.  
   368. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1439. 
   369. Good Faith in Corporate Law, supra note 6, at 30-31. 
   370. For discussion of the importance of Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence 
see sources cited supra note 2. 
   371. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 5, at 1436 (pointing out that 
expectations of corporate directors are rooted in “business realities and morés”). 
   372.  It is an oft-stated maxim that the genius of the common law arises from its 
adaptability.   
   373.   See supra note 154.  
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may well be forced to give way to the increasing federalization of 
corporate law so many have lamented.374  Of course, the Delaware 
General Assembly could readily resolve at least some of the dilemmas 
facing the courts with respect to this issue, but it has not yet elected 
to do so.375 
3. The language of the new good faith as a tool to help shape expectations of 
directors and  perceptions of their fiduciary obligations 
While it is a mistake to expect empty rhetoric to effect change, 
language does matter.  As Professor O’Connor notes, the “the way we 
talk about fiduciary obligation is crucial because the most 
distinguishing characteristic of fiduciary law is its operation as a 
system of moral education that promotes and reinforces trust and 
honesty in commercial transactions.”376  Similarly, as Professor 
Johnson points out, “a moral vocabulary has been, and should 
remain, central to corporate law discourse.”377  It is also true that legal 
standards exert influence far beyond the courtroom because they 
serve as the basis for the advice that counsel provide to their clients.378  
They can also create a kind of legal lore that influences actors in a 
positive way, just as a lawless “tone at the top” creates the kind of 
atmosphere that Congress sought to discourage in Sarbanes-Oxley.   
The language of the new good faith—e.g., “honesty of purpose”379 
and “a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders”380—implicitly recognizes that what 
people say influences what they do.  It calls directors to fidelity to the 
interests they are charged to protect in sharp contrast with the 
                                                          
   374.   See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
   375.   See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del Ch. 2003) (noting 
potential benefit of legislative action to correct “balkanization of duty of loyalty”  by 
revising section 102(b)(7)). 
   376. O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1318-19. 
   377. Loyalty Discourse, supra note 164, at 72; see also, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 965-66 
(2002); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law Professors, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1490-98 (2002).  Cf. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in 
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Dec. 2006) (suggesting that 
the highly secular nature of corporate discourse may inhibit understanding of many 
concepts, particularly the notion of faithfulness, and that allowing some of the 
language of faith to enter into the vocabulary could offer significant benefits). 
   378.   See Sale, supra note 18, at 494 (describing “real value” of duty of good faith as 
arising from “the ex ante role it can play in changing the behavior and incentives of 
corporate fiduciaries and thereby changing corporate governance”).  As the United 
States Supreme Court noted in Upjohn Co. v. United States, “corporations, unlike most 
individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.’”  449 U.S. 383, 
392 (quoting Bryson P. Birnbaum, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 
BUS. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)). 
 379. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
 380. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. June 8, 2006).   
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“cynical model of the corporate actor [that] has dominated the 
thinking about the nature of the fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
actors over the last twenty years.”381  The latter is the view lauded by 
Gordon Gecko in his rhapsody on the merits of greed in the movie 
Wall Street; it is also the view decried by famed former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan in his denunciation of a corporate culture 
“blighted by ‘infectious greed’” following the Enron debacle.382 
In addition to the threat of legal sanctions it holds out, the Disney 
standard promises to encourage adherence to fiduciary duty by 
reminding directors of the meaning of “true faithfulness.”383  As 
Professor Sale observes, when directors ignore problems they 
“contribute to an atmosphere of permissiveness, recklessness, or 
deliberate indifference that can result in bad governance and 
business decisions, or worse, illegal activity.384  To the extent that it 
voices a countervailing call, the new good faith promises to have an 
impact far beyond the boardroom. 
4. The new good faith as an alternative to prescriptive measures that create 
the risk of perverse incentives 
“Trust comes in many different forms and contexts, and it can be 
unpredictable and paradoxical in how it responds to different 
influences.”385  Moreover, “[m]istaken assumptions about the role and 
importance of external incentives in furthering cooperative behavior 
can lead not only to mistaken descriptions but also to mistaken 
prescriptions.”386  The effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley and other 
prescriptive approaches to the corporate trust crisis remains to be 
seen, but the new good faith does not pose the risk of perverse 
incentives.  Instead, it calls on directors to do their jobs. 
A strong, readily enforceable good faith obligation could well cause 
individuals—even those with excellent credentials—to think twice 
                                                          
   381. O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1317.  Professor O’Connor suggests that this 
model “presents a rather sterile view of fiduciary duty because it supports the idea 
[of] ‘honesty is the best policy’ as an appeal to self-interest.”  Id. 
 382. Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct:  The 
Overview; Fed Chief Blames Corporate Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, 
at A1 (quoting July 16, 2002 Cong. Testimony of Alan Greenspan); see also Daniel 
Altman, Parties Trade Lobs Over Issue of Lax Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C4 
(quoting U.S. Rep. Bernard Sanders of Vermont regarding “incredible culture of 
corporate greed”). 
 383. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. June 8, 2006).  See Blair & Stout, supra note 
294, at 1743 (one way law advances trust is “by framing the relationship between the 
fiduciary and her beneficiary as one that calls for a psychological commitment to 
trustworthy, other-regarding behavior”). 
 384. Sale, supra note 18, at 494-95. 
 385. Hall, supra note 296, at 525. 
 386. Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1808. 
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about serving as corporate directors.  Its demands, however, would be 
unlikely to deter persons who are truly willing to do the job.  As two 
noted Delaware jurists recently emphasized, “[i]ndependent 
directors who apply themselves to their duties in good faith have a 
trivial risk of legal liability.”387  If anything, the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the new good faith as a distinct fiduciary 
obligation is likely to help inspire directors to stand up to 
domineering CEOs, insist on receiving appropriate information, and 
overcome a variety of structural obstacles to active engagement in the 
business and affairs of their corporations.  Consequently, the new 
good faith is most likely to deter only those who do not belong on 
corporate boards—those who are unable or unwilling to commit to 
doing the job—from becoming directors.388  That is precisely what it 
ought to do. 
CONCLUSION 
The new good faith has emerged at a critical time in the history of 
American corporate governance.  It is unclear whether corporate 
directors can reclaim the high ground, but it is certain that they will 
not succeed unless they actively engage in their oversight 
responsibilities.  In accord with this reality, while remaining faithful 
to the spirit of the exculpatory provision of Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law, the Disney standard holds out the promise that a 
new, more comprehensive concept of good faith will become a 
recognized principal fiduciary responsibility of corporate directors.  
This new good faith focuses on “true faithfulness and devotion to the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders”389 as its measure, 
and holds that conscious disregard of duty exposes directors to 
personal liability. 
                                                          
 387. Corporate Universe, supra note 2, at 170 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Director 
Liability Warnings, BUS. & SEC. LITIGATOR (2003)); see also, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, 
Annual Audit Committee Issues Conference Keynote Speech:  “A Perspective on Liability Risks to 
Directors in Light of Current Events”, 1486 PLI/CORP. 1227 (2005). 
   388.  As Delaware’s Vice Chancellor Strine has observed, “If an overly busy person 
serves on the boards of five public companies . . .  [and] finds himself in a situation 
where one of his companies is accused of serious wrongdoing that the board 
arguably should have prevented, he should not be surprised if his good faith comes 
under severe attack. . . .”  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on 
the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW 1371, 1373 (2002) 
(quoted in Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee’s Ethical and Legal Responsibilities:  
The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 38 (2005)).  According to a posting on 
the Shearman & Sterling LLP website, cited in Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and 
the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129, 162 (2006), “[a]t least one director of forty-
five of the top 100 companies serves on five or more public company boards.”  See 
also supra note 314. 
 389. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755.). 
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In exploring the parameters of the new good faith, we have argued 
three principal points.  First, we have suggested that the most 
important legal innovation of the new good faith is its recognition of 
the substantive difference between the traditional standard and 
conscious disregard of a known duty to act.  We have emphasized that 
if the Disney standard is to function as a meaningful norm for holding 
corporate directors accountable, it is critical to clarify that the new 
good faith does not require the presence of subjectively improper 
motivation. 
Second, we have maintained that it is analytically cleaner to 
articulate the Disney standard in terms of an absence of good faith 
rather than the presence of bad faith.  The Delaware Supreme Court, 
however, has defined the hallmark of the new good faith—conscious 
disregard of duty—as evidence of bad faith.  Consequently, it is 
incumbent on the courts to ensure that the criteria applied in this 
context clearly define a new bad faith, one that clearly embraces 
conscious disregard of known duties, regardless of intention, and 
focuses on what directors have done or failed to do.  Otherwise, there 
is a real risk that references to “bad faith conduct” set forth in both 
Disney V and the Disney IV decision it upholds, as well as in Stone,  will 
reduce the new fiduciary duty to little more than a minor, and 
perhaps meaningless, variation on the classic duty of loyalty. 
Finally, we have suggested that, if reasonably interpreted and 
enforced, the Disney standard is capable of playing a significant role 
in restoring corporate trust.  While the scope of the new good faith 
obligation is modest, its objectives are important.  Unless outside 
directors take their responsibility to engage actively in corporate 
affairs very seriously, they have little if any chance of functioning 
effectively to oversee the operations and finances of these highly 
sophisticated, increasingly complex organizations.  Society has a great 
deal at stake in their success.  Ensuring that those who direct the 
business and affairs of corporations have effective incentives and the 
structural support necessary to perform their function responsibly is a 
critical task of corporate law. 
 
